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STATE  SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY:
FIVE  AUTHORS  IN  SEARCH  OF  A THEORY
DanielJ Meltzer*
The  Supreme  Court's  federalism jurisprudence  has  repeatedly
been characterized  as under-theorized.'  The three  sovereign  immu-
nity decisions handed down on the Term's last day-Alden v. Maine, 2
College Savings Bank v. Florida  Prepaid  Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, 3  and Florida  Prepaid  Postsecondary  Education  Expense Board v.  Col-
lege Savings Bank 4---provide still more support for that view.  Together
with  decisions  of the past few years-  United States v.  Lopez,5  City  of
*  Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  My thoughts on this topic have
been shaped in  numerous  conversations  with my  colleagues  Dick Fallon  and David
Shapiro.  I have also drawn on material included in RicHARD H. FALLON,JR.,  DANIELJ.
MEL=ZER,  & DAVID  L.  SHAPmo,  HART  &  WECHSLER'S  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE
FEDERAL  SySTEM  (4th  ed.  Supp.  1999)  [hereinafter  HART  &  WECHSLER'S  1999
SuPPLEmENT],  of which Professor Shapiro was  the primary author.  I am  grateful, in
addition, to both Professors Fallon and Shapiro, and to Charles Fried, Andy Kaufinan,
Bernard Meltzer, Larry Tribe, and Ann Woolhandler, for reading and providing very
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Joshua Berman  provided invaluable research
assistance.
1  See, e.g.,  Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer,  The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz,  and  Yeskey,  1998  Sul,.  CT. REV.  71;  Evan H. Caminker,  State Sover-
eignty and Subordinacy:  May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal  Law?,
95 COLUM.  L. REV.  1001  (1995);  Roderick M. Hills,Jr.,  The Political  Economy of Coopera-
tive Federalism:  Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual  Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 813  (1998);  Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111  HARv. L.  REv.  2180  (1998);  Martin  H. Redish,  Constitutionalizing
Federalism:  A Foundational  Analysis, 23  OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1237, 1247-48 (1997);  Mark
Tushnet,  Keeping Your Eye  on the Ball  The Significance of the Revival of Constitutional
Federalism, 13 GA.  ST. U. L. Rnv.  1065  (1997).
2  119  S. Ct. 2240  (1999).
3  119  S.  Ct. 2219  (1999).
4  119  S.  Ct.  2199  (1999).
5  514 U.S. 549  (1995).
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Boerne v. Ilores,6 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 7  and Printz v.  United States 8-
they do make clear, however, that the  majority's commitment  to im-
posing  constitutional  limits  on  national  legislative  authority  is  far-
reaching.9
In this Essay,  I offer some observations about the implications  of
last Term's decisions for the enforcement of federal law and about the
relationship of those decisions  more broadly  to judicial enforcement
of constitutional limits on federal power.  What is most striking about
last Term's decisions, in my view,  is their effort to enforce a vision of
constitutional federalism not by restricting the reach of congressional
authority  to  regulate  the  states,  but rather by limiting  the remedial
means by which Congress  may enforce regulation  of the states that is
otherwise  within  its  substantive  legislative  power.  In  ways  that  the
Court fails  to  acknowledge,  its  effort falls  to  promote  any  coherent
conception  of states'  rights  or state autonomy  while haning legiti-
mate national  objectives.
I.  IMMUNITY  AND  THE Lrmrrs  OF NATIONAL  AUTHORIT
The  limits  on  national  legislative  authority  imposed  by  the
Court's recent  decisions  fall  into  two  sets.  First are  subject matters
that are deemed  to fall beyond national legislative  power altogether.
The  leading  cases  here  are  Lopez,  holding  that  a  federal  statute
prohibiting the possession of firearms near schools fell outside of the
Commerce Power, and  City of  Boerne, holding that the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 199310  (RFRA),  as applied to state and local
governments, was outside of congressional  authority under Section  5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, even when Congress is legislating as to matters generally
within  its  constitutional  authority,  some  legislative  techniques  are
deemed  to  be  constitutionally  impermissible  because  they  are  not
6  521  U.S.  507  (1997).
7  517 U.S.  44  (1996).
8  521  U.S.  898  (1997).
9  Three years ago, after noting the hazards of prediction, I suggested that there
is reason  to believe  that  "the decision  in  Seminole [Tribe] is  not one of a mounting
series of blows to the reach of national power, but rather a gesture in the direction of
a diffuse conception of state sovereignty that in the end will not be generally enforced
by the Court."  Daniel J.  Meltzer,  The Seminole  Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 Sup. CT. REV.  1, 65.  Subsequent events have confirmed my view that such predic-
tions are  hazardous.
10  Pub. L. No.  103-141,  107 Stat. 1488  (1993)  (codified at 42 U.S.C.  § 2000bb to
bb-4  (1994)).
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"Necessary and Proper""  or otherwise  invade an area of state auton-
omy.  Before  this  Term, one  could  have summarized  these limits  as
follows:
(1)  Anti-Commandeering.  Congress  may  not  unconditionally 2
commandeer  state  or local legislative  or executive  officialsI3  to carry
out federally-imposed  duties-except  possibly when  Congress  legis-
lates  under  the  enforcement  clauses  of  the  Reconstruction
amendments.'
4
(2)  Eleventh Amendment Immunity.  Absent state consent, a federal
court may not, consistent with the Eleventh  Amendment, entertain a
claim in a private suit  (i.e.,  one brought by a plaintiff other than a
state  or the United States)  that (a) names a state as a defendant,  or
(b) even if nominally against a state official, can be viewed as seeking
certain forms of relief (notably damages against the state fisc) that are
deemed to be "retrospective" 5 -except  when  Congress is  exercising
11  See,  e.g., Alden v. Maine,  119 S.  Ct. 2240,  2256 (1999).
When a "La[w]  ...  for carrying into Execution" the Commerce  Clause vio-
lates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional
provisions...  it is not a "La[w]  ...  proper for carrying into Execution  the
Commerce Clause," and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, "merely [an]
ac[t]  of usurpation" which "deserve[s]  to be treated as such."
Id. (quoting Pfrintz, 521 U.S. at 923-24 (quoting TiE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alex-
ander Hamilton)))  (omissions and alterations in Printz).
12  The dissenters in Printz  asserted, without response from the majority, that the
Court's decision did not rule out "commandeering" as a condition of federal spend-
ing or federal non-preemption  of state  law.  Printz, 521  U.S. at 958-62  (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).  Whether that  reading  is  correct  remains  to  be  seen.  See infra notes
210-11.
13  Pfrintz reaffirmed a distinction between statejudicial officers (who may in some
circumstances be required to  implement federal  law)  and other state  officers  (who
may not be) that the Court first elaborated in New  York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
178-79  (1992).  See Pfintz, 521  U.S. at 927-29 & n.14.
14  As to whether statutes  enacted under the enforcement  clauses  of the Recon-
struction amendments stand on a different footing, see Pennsylvania  Department of Cor-
rections v.  Yeskey,  524 U.S.  206, 212-13  (1998),  Adler & Kreimer,  supra note  1,  at
119-33,  Evan  H. Caminker, Printz,  State Sovereignty and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
Sup.  CT. REV.  199, 236-42, and see also Kathryn Abrams, No "There" There: State Auton-
omy  and Voting Rights Regulation, 65  U.  CoLo.  L.  REv.  835  (1994)  (noting how fre-
quently  federal voting  rights  legislation  requires  states  to  enact  changes  in  their
internal political structures).
15  For a discussion of the haziness of the distinction between "retrospective" and
"prospective" relief, of the failure of the Court's decisions to  track common under-
standings  of those  terms, and the possibility that some Justices  have abandoned  the
distinction  in recent  opinions,  see  Carlos Manuel  VSizquez,  Night and Day: Coeur
d'Alene,  Breard,  and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective  Distinction  in Eleventh
200o] 1013NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
(with an  adequately  clear statement)  its enforcement  powers  under
the Reconstruction  amendments.' 6
Allied  to  these  two  autonomy-based  limits  is  a rule  of statutory
construction,  though  one with  constitutional  foundations, providing
that federal legislation  will not be interpreted to intrude  on a sphere
of state  political  autonomy,  absent  a  clear  statement  by  Congress.
That sphere has been variously described  as "areas traditionally regu-
lated by the States,"' 7 "decisions that 'go to the heart of representative
government,"'" 8  and  "state governmental  functions."19  Some  opin-
ions  hint that at least  certain  state  functions  may  be  immune  not
merely from "commandeering" but more broadly from federal regula-
tion,  even  when  Congress  has  included  an  adequately  clear
statement.
20
So things stood when the Court handed down its immunity deci-
sions  last Term, which  sharpened  both  kinds  of limits  on national
power.  One, the  Florida Prepaid  decision,  narrows  the reach  of con-
gressional  enforcement  authority under Section  5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment by invalidating a legislative effort to permit patent hold-
ers  to enforce their property rights against states engaged in infringe-
ment.2'  The  other  two  broaden  the  scope  of  state  sovereign
immunity:  College Savings Bank expanded  the  scope  of the Eleventh
Amendment in federal court,22 and  Alden v. Maine extended to states
an immunity from state court suit  generally equivalent to  the immu-
nity in federal court conferred by the Supreme Court's interpretation
Amendment Doctrine,  87  GEO.  LJ. 1  (1998),  and see also David P. Currie,  Sovereign Im-
munity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 Sup.  CT. REv.  149.
16  On whether Congress has the same power to abrogate under the Enforcement
Clause  of the  13th  Amendment  as  it  possesses  under  those  of the  14th  and  15th
Amendments,  see  Henry  Paul  Monaghan,  The  Sovereign Immunity  "Exception,"  110
HARV. L. REV.  102,  107 n.33  (1996).
17  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501  U.S.  452, 459  (1991).
18  Id. at 461  (quoting Sugarman  v. Dougall, 413 U.S.  634,  647  (1973)).
19  Gregory, 501  U.S. at 469.
20  See, e.g.,  Gregory, 501  U.S. at 464  (stating that adoption of the plain statement
rule "may avoid a potential  constitutional  problem");  Garcia v.  San  Antonio  Metro.
Transit Auth.,  469  U.S.  528,  556  (1985)  (citing  Coyle  v. Oklahoma,  221  U.S.  559
(1911))  ("These  cases do  not require us to identify or define what affirmative  limits
the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under
the Commerce Clause.").
21  See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College  Say. Bank, 119
S.  Ct. 2199  (1999).
22  See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119
S.  Ct. 2219  (1999).
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of  the  Eleventh  Amendment.23  Collectively,  the  three  decisions
sharply limit federal power to enforce  federal obligations  validly im-
posed on state governments  through the remedy  of private suits for
damages.
II.  IMMNnd  Y AND  T=E ENFORCEMENT  OF FEDERAL  LAW
The roots of the broadest of the three decisions,  Alden v. Maine,
lie in  the Court's decision  three years  earlier, in  Seminole Tribe, that
Congress  lacks power when legislating under Article I to provide for
full enforcement in federal court of a state's federal duties.  In partic-
ular, the  Seminole Tribe Court held that Congress's powers under Arti-
cle I do not include the authorization of private suits that name states
as defendants  or that seek "retrospective" relief from state officials.
The  questions  whether  Seminole  Tribe  was  correctly  decided,
whether it was  a  necessary  implication  of  Hans v.  Louisiana, 24  and
whether  Hans itself  was  correctly  decided  have  been  much  dis-
cussed.25  However one  answers  those questions,  once  Seminole Tribe
was  decided as it was,  the issue whether  state courts were required to
hear the very suits that  Seminole Tribe excluded from federal jurisdic-
tion assumed great importance.  Commenting on Seminole Tribe, I sug-
gested that "a freedom from unconsented federal court suit by private
individuals seeking retrospective relief-and  then  only if the statute
cannot  be  viewed  as  enforcing  one  of the  Reconstruction  amend-
ments [-]  ...  is a curious and unstable place for the last stand of state
sovereignty."2 6  Alden, in extending to the state courts a state's immu-
nity from  unconsented  private  suit (here  suit by state  employees to
obtain  overtime  wages  required  by  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act
(FLSA)), proves that Seminolewas not in fact the last stand.  But if after
Alden the scope  of constitutional  protection  of state  autonomy  has
shifted, the current resting place remains  curious and perhaps unsta-
ble as well.
An evaluation of Alden must start with the majority's acknowledg-
ment that Congress has constitutional authority to regulate  the labor
standards of state and local employees.  That was the holding, after all,
of the 5-4 decision in  Garcia  v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit  Author-
23  See Alden v. Maine,  119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).  For a discussion of possible differ-
ences between federal court and state court immunity, see infra note 95  (discussing
Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S.  106  (1994)).
24  134 U.S.  1  (1890).
25  My own views are set forth in Meltzer,  supra note 9.
26  Id. at 62.
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27  in  1985.  Although one  shouldn't bet the farm  against  Garcia's
being overruled,28 it remains the law for now.  Moreover, Alden, while
failing even to cite Garcia,  re-affirmed that the statutory elaboration of
federal labor standards for the states was not to be merely precatory;
the  Alden majority mentions three mechanisms  by which those duties
might constitutionally be enforced:  suit by the United States, private
suit against state officers  to enjoin ongoing violations, and private suit
against  state  officers  seeking  damages  from  them in  their personal
capacity.
The question Alden presented is whether an additional and famil-
iar remedial  technique-a  damage  action by injured parties  against
the organization  responsible for the injury-is constitutionally imper-
missible  when  the  organization  is  a  state  government.  The impor-
tance  of  that  technique  to  enforcement  of  federal  law  surely  is
relevant to  (though not necessarily  determinative of)  that question.
The significance  of organizational  liability for damages  may be
highlighted by showing the major shortcomings in each of the permis-
sible alternatives  noted by the majority.  Begin with private  suits for
prospective  injunctions.  Quite  apart  from  the  need  to  amend  the
FLSA to  authorize employees  to seek prospective  relief,29 many viola-
tions do not arise from ongoing practices subject to injunctive orders,
while in other cases  (Alden included")  the  employer  may come into
compliance  so  as  to  make  injunctive  relief  inappropriate.  In those
cases, a rule that only injunctions may be obtained is tantamount to a
rule  that no  relief is  available.  Even  where  ongoing  practices  exist,
merely enjoining their continuation fails to compensate for harm suf-
fered, and  may not by itself provide adequate  incentives  for reason-
ably  complete  and  prompt  compliance.  On  the  latter  point, state
27  469  U.S. 528  (1985).
28  For the view that Garcia  has already been effectively overruled, seeJohn C. Yoo,
The  Judicial  Safeguards of  Federalism,  70 S.  CAL. L. REV.  1311,  1334  (1997).  One month
after granting certiorari in Alden, 119  S. Ct. 443 (1998),  the Supreme Court denied a
petition for certiorari that, in seeking review of a federal court action under the FLSA
brought by  private  individuals  against a local  government,  presented  the  question
whether  Garcia  should be overruled.  See West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752,
760-61  (4th Cir.),  cert. denied, 119  S.  Ct. 607  (1998).
29  See 29 U.S.C. §§  211 (a), 216(b),  217 (1994)  (granting to the Secretary of Labor
authority to seek, inter alia, prospective relief against employers but granting employ-
ees authority to seek only back wages and liquidated damages);  see also Barrentine  v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,  Inc., 750  F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1984);  Keenan V.  Allan,  889 F.
Supp. 1320,  1382  (E.D.  Wash. 1995)  (stating that "with the exception of child labor
law violations, only the Secretary of Labor may seek an order to restrain violations  of
the FLSA"),  affd, 91  F.3d 1275  (9th Cir. 1996).
30  See Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2269.
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officials who act as Holmesian bad men would have little to lose, and
much to gain, by resisting compliance with the FLSA unless and until
an injunction is  obtained.31
Of course, state officials do not generally act as bad men: routine
rule-following, respect for the law, and desire to avoid the burdens of
litigation  often will induce  compliance  with federal  duties.  In some
instances, however,  these factors may operate  only weakly, and then
the threat of retrospective organizational liability will be an important
enforcement technique in the public as in the private sector.  Among
the situations where such liability is of particular importance are those
in which the scope of federal duties is uncertain or the cost of compli-
ance is very high; in such cases, the prospect of liability for non-com-
pliance  may induce greater  care  in considering  whether federal  law
truly permits the conduct in question.32
31  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415  U.S.  651,  692  (1974)  (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Absent any remedy which may act with retroactive  effect, state welfare  offi-
cials have  everything to gain  and nothing to lose  by failing to  comply with
the congressional  mandate that assistance be paid with reasonable  prompt-
ness to all  eligible individuals.  This is  not idle speculation without basis in
practical  experience.  In  this very case, for example,  Illinois  officials  have
knowingly violated since 1968 federal regulations on the strength of an argu-
ment as to its invalidity which even  the majority deems  unworthy of discus-
sion....  Without a retroactive-payment  remedy, we  are indeed faced with
"the spectre of a state, perhaps calculatingly, defying federal law and thereby
depriving welfare recipients  of the financial  assistance  Congress  thought it
was giving them."
Id.  (quotingJordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1972));  see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.  Meltzer,  New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional  Remedies,
104 HAuv. L. REV.  1731,  1793  (1991)  (noting that broad refusals  to issue retroactive
remedies based on expansive conceptions  of new law  "threaten the maintenance  of
an appropriate  structure of incentives  to  learn and  comply with  constitutional  [or
other federal]  rules").
In a related vein, Vicki Jackson suggested to  me in conversation  that the Alden
decision reduces the incentives for plaintiffs'  lawyers to devote time to seeking out-of-
court resolutions  with  state  officials,  and for state  officials  to  be  receptive  to  such
approaches, for only when an injunctive order  is secured  does the government face
the possibility (through contempt sanctions) of monetary liability to a private plaintiff
for noncompliance with federal  law.  See infra note 48.  Alden thus strengthens  the
incentives of plaintiffs  to go to court immediately and of defendants to use delaying
tactics.
32  John Jeffi-ies  has objected  to unlimited governmental  damage  liability in the
context of actions under 42  U.S.C. § 1983  (1994).  He would restrict such liability to
situations  in which state actors are at fault, which he would determine  by applying a
test analogous to existing qualified immunity doctrine in §  1983 actions.  SeeJohn C.
Jeffries, Jr.,  In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment  and Section 1983, 84 VA.  L.  REV.  47,
50-51  (1998).  It is not clear whetherJeffries would extend his analysis to violations of
statutory duties like those under the FLSA or federal intellectual property laws.  How-
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Alden does not, of course, limit enforcement to injunctive actions.
But while it leaves open two avenues for obtaining retrospective  dam-
ages  relief, both have  serious shortcomings.  The first is for injured
parties to sue state  officers  personally for damages.33  Without more,
the resulting regime would be inadequate for plaintiffs, intolerable for
state  governments,  and  unfair  to  state  officials.3 4  Such  a  regime
would, however, in turn pressure states  to  indemnify their officials,  a
move in the direction of governmental liability. 3 5  Yet it is too easy, in
my view, to  equate  officer  liability accompanied  by indemnification
with  direct  governmental  liability.36  To  begin  with, here  too,  Con-
gress would need to ensure that a range of statutes applicable  to state
governments  in fact impose monetary liability on individual officers,
ever, his analysis is policy-driven;  he does not suggest that the Constitution demands
his preferred regime.  See id. at 51.
For present purposes, what is important is that the Alden rule  does not address
the problem  that concerns Jeffries.  Even if one  agrees  with his  analysis,  one would
want a fault requirement whether the nominal defendant was a state or local govern-
ment or an individual officer.  Alden, by contrast, leaves open the possibility that indi-
vidual officers  (in their personal capacity) or local governments might be held liable
even  when  not "at fault" while  precluding  the  imposition  of retrospective  liability
upon state governments even when their "fault" for having violated federal law is un-
disputed.  See also Larry Kramer & Alan  0.  Sykes,  Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup.  CT. REV.  249,  272.
A recent manuscript  of Daryl  Levinson  argues  that the imposition  of constitu-
tional damages liability upon  governmental units for torts and takings is  ineffectual
because  governments  fail to  internalize  the  costs  of constitutional remedies;  some
aspects of his argument would seem to  extend to governmental  damages liability  in
general.  See DarylJ. Levinson,  Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Alloca-
tion of Constitutional  Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv.  (forthcoming Spring 2000).  While Levin-
son's argument seems  to me exaggerated, for present purposes  the  critical  point is
that it, like Jeffries's argument,  is a functional  one about the desirable allocation  of
liability; unlike the Alden opinion, Levinson does not make a constitutional argument
that Congress, even if it seeks to impose governmental  liability, should be precluded
from doing so.  See id.
33  See Regents v. Doe, 519 U.S.  425  (1997); Jeffries,  supra note 32, at 49.
34  See generally PETER SCHUCY,  SUING  GOVERNMENT  (1981).
35  See Fallon  & Meltzer,  supra  note  31, at 1823; Jeffries,  supra  note 32, at 62.  In-
deed, Kramer and  Sykes have  argued that if one makes certain  heroic assumptions,
individual  and entity  liability are indistinguishable.  See Kramer & Sykes,  supra note
32, at 272.
36  For  an argument that views  the two  regimes  as being closer to  parity than  I
would, but that acknowledges  the limitations of simpler assertions of parity as well as
many of the pertinent  uncertainties, see Jeffries,  supra note 32, at 49-50, 62-66, and
see also  Carlos Manuel Vzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity 2, 106 YALE  L.J.
1683,  1775  (1997).
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amending existing provisions when necessary.37 'Beyond that, the idea
of personal  liability would  in some  cases be jarring:  imagine  if the
state director  of revenue  or of public  assistance,  for  example, were
personally  liable  for  the  "refund"  of past  taxes  that had been  col-
lected, or for payment of past welfare benefits that had been denied,
in violation of federal law-even if the amounts involved totaled mil-
lions  of dollars.38  In  addition,  such  a regime  would  require  some-
times  difficult  and burdensome  determinations  of which  official(s)
should be held  personally liable  for illegal action.3 9  For that and a
range of other reasons,juries may hesitate to award adequate damages
against individual officers serving the public under often difficult con-
ditions.4°  And  even  with  complete  indemnification,  officials  might
well have  grounds  to fear the entry  of significant judgments  against
them  personally.41  Moreover,  indemnification,  though  generally
thought to be widespread, is not universal: for example, some employ-
37  The FLSA's substantive wage and hour provisions impose liability only on "em-
ployers,"  see 29  U.S.C.  § 206(a)  (1994  &  Supp. III  1997),  but that term is  broadly
defined  to  "include(]  any person acting directly  or indirectly  in  the interest of an
employer in  relation to an employee."  Id.  § 203(d).  Most courts have ruled that an
employer's agent who exercises  supervisory authority over  an employee's wages  and
hours may  be jointly and  severally  liable with  the  employing  organization,  see,  e.g.,
Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509  (1st Cir. 1983), although some of the holdings in
this line relate  to the owners  or chief executive  officers of small businesses,  see,  e.g.,
United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enter., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995), and thus
might not support imposing liability, for example, on a middle manager in  a large
bureaucracy.  Moreover, one circuit has taken the quite different view that individual
supervisors  are never  personally liable under the FLSA.  See Wascura v.  Carver, 169
F.3d 683,  686  (11th Cir. 1999).
Individual liability is less certain still under other federal statutes.  For example,
considerable  authority denies that individual  defendants may be held personally lia-
ble for damages under the Age Discrimination  in  Employment Act  (ADEA) and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  See, e.g., Butler v. Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736,
743-44  (10th  Cir. 1999)  (collecting cases).
38  In  this regard, the Alden Court's endorsement of personal liability included an
ambiguous qualification: "Even a suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a
state officer in  his individual  capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly
attributable  to the officer himself,  so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury
but from  the  officer  personally."  Alden, 119  S.  CL  at  2267-68  (emphasis  added).
Whether the Court meant to suggest a limit on congressional power to impose liability
on state  officers for particular state action to which they had only a  limited connec-
tion remains  to be seen.
39  See supra note 38.
40  See, e.g., Jeffiies,  supra note 32, at 50-51.
41  See id.
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ees or agencies may  (advertently or otherwise)  be excluded;42 indem-
nification  may  be  permissive  rather  than  mandatory43  (though
admittedly a routine practice of permissive indemnification may blunt
any distinction); some states impose monetary limits on indemnifica-
tion;44  and many  indemnification  provisions  exclude conduct  that is
criminal, egregious, willful, or the like.45  Given these kinds of gaps, to
shift damages liability from state governments  to state  officials would
at a minimum have  the most serious transition costs.
Finally, even universal indemnification may not be equivalent to
governmental  liability.  Consider a case  like  Harper v.  Virginia Depart-
ment of Taxation, 46 where  the  state's  retrospective liability for having
collected an unconstitutional  tax was estimated to be several hundred
million dollars.  Even if positive law authorized suit against the official
who directed the state revenue department for those enormous sums,
assume  that the official's net worth was  $100,000.  If a $200  million
judgment were entered against the official, would the state, because of
its indemnification  policy, simply write a check for that amount to the
plaintiffs?  A state indemnification  law could  surely be written  to re-
quire that result, and some may, but there is also authority suggesting
that a government's  obligation  to indemnify does not mature  at the
time that a judgment is entered against an indemnitee but only when
the indemnitee  has  sustained a loss  by  actual  payment  of the judg-
ment. 4 7  One could surely imagine that a state faced with a $200  mil-
42  See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation,  Validity and Construction of Statute Authoriz-
ing or Requiring Governmental Unit to Indemnify Public Officer or Employee for Liability
Arising out of  Performance of Public  Duties, 71  A.L.R.3d  90  (1976).
43  That is the case in my home state  of Massachusetts.  See MAss.  GEN.  LAWS.  ch.
258, § 9  (1992).
44  See id. (setting a one million dollar limit).
45  See, e.g., A.A. CODE §  11-47-24 (1992 & Lexis Supp. 1999)  (requiring state agen-
cies to indemnify employees from anyjudgment arising out of performance  of official
duties except where the employee's conduct was "intentional or willful or wanton");
COLO.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  § 24-10-110  (West 1992 & Supp. 1999)  (requiring public enti-
ties to defend and indemnify  employees from judgments  arising out of official  con-
duct, except where  conduct was  "willful and wanton").
46  509  U.S. 86,  129  (1993).
47  That appears to be the case in my home state of Massachusetts.  SeeFilippone v.
Mayor of Newton, 452 N.E.2d 239, 244  (Mass. Ct. App.  1983).  The Filippone  decision
was reversed by the state's highest court, whose opinion cast some doubt on the use-
fulness,  in the specific  circumstances of the case,  of a distinction  between broad  in-
demnity for liability of an indemnitee  (which would be established simply by entry of
a judgment)  and a more  limited  indemnity  for losses  suffered  by  the indemnitee
(which would be established  only by payment or execution of the judgment).  The
court did not, however, reject the distinction more generally.  See Filippone v. Mayor
of Newton, 467 N.E.2d 182, 186-87  (Mass. 1984);  see also Restivo v. Town of Swansea,
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lion judgment would take the view that it would indemnify the official
to the extent of any execution of the judgment (e.g., the value of bank
accounts or real estate seized, or of wages garnished) but would refuse
to pay the plaintiffs more than that-perhaps in turn leading to a set-
flement likely to be closer to $100,000  than to $200  million.
Thus,  the  first  option  for  damages  actions  that  Alden  leaves
open-relying on the imposition of personal liability coupled with in-
demnification-may not in fact be tantamount to the alternative  that
Alden prohibits-governmental liability.  But even if the former in fact
worked no differently from the latter, Alden and Seminole Tribe would
simply mean  that  Congress  could indirectly achieve  the result  those
cases  prohibit, but in  order  to  do  so  would  have  to  (a)  amend  a
number of federal enactments to make them provide for personal lia-
bility of state officials, and (b) impose a personal liability that is suffi-
ciently  harsh  to  ensure  that state  governments  effectively  have  no
choice but to provide  universal indemnification to the full extent of
any judgments  entered  against  state  officials.  That kind  of federal
pressure, even if it were to provide an adequate substitute for govern-
mental liability, hardly seems like a blow for harmonious federalism. 48
The other possibility for damages liability that remains viable af-
ter Alden is suit by the United States on behalf of the victims of federal
violations-a course  that the FLSA expressly authorizes.4 9  Here  too,
however, in order to avail itself of this technique more generally, Con-
gress would have to amend other statutory schemes  (for example, pat-
ent and copyright  laws)  under which, at present, no federal agency
has authority to bring suit. And one should not underestimate what a
dramatic shift in enforcement techniques would be required.  For ex-
ample, under the FLSA, private suits  (whether against private or pub-
495 N.E.2d 838, 839  (Mass. 1986)  (holding, in a suit by plaintiffs against a town seek-
ing a writ of mandamus requiring the town to pay the plaintiffs the amount of unsatis-
fied judgments  obtained  by them  against town  police  officers,  that the  applicable
indemnification  provision "does not require  the defendant town  to satisfy the plain-
tiffi'  . ..  judgments against the town's police officers").
48  See Meltzer, supra  note 9,  at 48.  In  Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.  678,  691  & n.17
(1978),  an action  against state  officials,  the  Court affirmed  an  order awarding  the
plaintiffs certain attorney's fees, to be paid out of the state treasury-an order that the
Court treated as  analogous  to  compensatory contempt.  In rejecting  the argument
that the order violated the 11th Amendment because it required payment by the state
rather than by the officials,  the Court declared that to have made  the officials liable
for the fee award "would be a remarkable way to treat individuals who have relied on
the Attorney General to represent their interests throughout this litigation,"  id. at 692
n.19-despite the  possibility, mentioned in the  Hutto dissent,  see id. at  716  (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting),  that state law permitted indemnification.
49  See 29  U.S.C. § 216(c)  (1994).
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lic  employers)  outnumber  suits  by the  United  States  by  a  ratio  of
roughly ten to one.50  Though I doubt that statistic would have sur-
prised the majority, it does cast doubt on the Court's cavalier sugges-
tion  that  the  lawsuit  in  Alden  must  not have  been  that important
because "the United States  apparently found [the federal interest  in
compensating  the State's employees for past violations of federal law]
insufficient tojustify sending even a single attorney to Maine to prose-
cute  this litigation."
51
Of course, a Congress devoted to full enforcement  could in the-
ory both  confer  broad  enforcement  authority  on federal  agencies
(where necessary, creating new ones)  and sharply increase appropria-
tions.  But  the  implausibility  of such  a  response  goes  far  beyond
doubts that the  current Congress would be so inclined.52  For it has
long been  noted that  the budgets  of public  enforcement  agencies
"tend to be small in relation  to the potential gains from enforcement
as they would be appraised by a private, profit-maximizing enforcer."53
Nor does the fact that a violator of federal law is a state agency neces-
sarily provide a reason for public enforcement; if a university has de-
nied overtime wages to an employee,  or infringed a patent, it is hard
to see why the appropriate  enforcement  strategy should differ if the
violator  is Penn  State  (a state  school)  rather  than  the University of
Pennsylvania (a private one).  Indeed, Congress may reasonably doubt
that federal  governmental resources  are wisely used  to pursue litiga-
tion  against  state  agencies  when  a  private  rightholder's  interest  is
great but the public interest may be small.
50  The  following statistics  are  compiled from  the Report of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts on the Judicial Business of the United States Courts
for 1997  and  1998,  Hd. C-2 (visited Jan.  17,  2000)  <http://www.USCourts.gov/judi-
cialbusiness/c02Sep97.pdf>.
CIVIL  CASES  COMMENCED  IN  U.S. DisTRiCr  COURTS  UNDER  THE FLSA
U.S.  as  Plaintiff  Other Plaintiff  Total  Cases
1997  143  1490  1633
1998  150  1412  1562
These statistics do not distinguish suits against states from those against other defend-
ants.  Since private plaintiffs sometimes  file in state court but the United States virtu-
ally  never  does,  these  federal  court statistics  may  slightly  understate  the  ratio  of
private-plaintiff cases  to U.S.-as-plaintiff cases.
51  119 S.  Ct. at 2269.
52  See generally Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional  Order and the Chas-
tening of Constitutional  Aspiration, 113  HARV.  L.  REV.  26, 51-56  (1999)  (highlighting
impediments  to  national  action arising from  the existing  configuration  of political
forces).
53  William  M.  Landes  & Richard  A.  Posner,  The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STuD.  1,  36  (1975).
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Moreover, public and private enforcement are different animals.
Government bureaucracies  may respond far less quickly than private
lawyers  to shifting demand for enforcement action, and even decen-
tralized governmental  bureaucracies  are  likely to be  less convenient
and flexible  than  are  private  lawyers.  The point is not that private
enforcement  of damage remedies  against states  is always  superior to
public enforcement, but rather that it often will be superior, and thus
there  are  considerable  costs  to  holding  private  enforcement
unconstitutional.
The Court does not concern itself with these issues, but stresses
instead  that when  states  must pay  damages  in  suits  by the  United
States,  the enforcement  action is taken by politically responsible  offi-
cials.54  Perhaps the Court is offering a novel extension of the familiar
political  safeguards  of federalism  argument-suggesting  that  such
safeguards should restrain not only the exercise of legislative authority
but also the decision whether to sue a state that has violated congres-
sionally-created  duties.  Those  safeguards  may  indeed  operate  in
broadly similar fashion on both federal political branches.55  That sim-
54  See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
55  Evan Caminker has recently suggested a different point of view: "federal prose-
cutors  have no duty of loyalty to  states per se, and thus it seems  dubious that they
would refrain from initiating an otherwise  promising suit out of an abstract respect
for the states's dignitary interests."  Evan H. Caminker,  State Immunity Waivers for  Suits
by  the United States, 98 MIci.  L.  REV.  92,  122  (1999).  My  own belief-based  in  part
upon recollections from working at the Department of Health Education and Welfare
in the  Carter Administration-is  that a broader view of federal  enforcement would
reveal a great deal more complexity than is found in Caminker's picture of prosecu-
tors making  discrete decisions whether  a particular case  is  meritorious.  In  federal
agencies, regulation frequently involves a complex of techniques-information  gath-
ering, informal oversight, notice of non-compliance, negotiation of remedial plans-
and litigation is often a last resort.  In that environment, deciding what is a "promis-
ing suit-that is, an occasion for litigation rather than for other approaches to secur-
ing compliance-may not be clearcut.  Additional unclarity about whether to bring a
"promising suit-for example, against Maine  for violation of the FLSA-arises be-
cause such a decision  is likely  to implicate  the question whether  to allocate  scarce
resources to suing the state or, instead, to bringing a "promising suit" against a private
regulatee.
In making decisions that are, it seems  to me, less open and shut than Caminker
suggests,  officials are often operating in a somewhat politicized environment.  While
Caminker's primary concern  is with qui  tam actions under the False Claims Act, in
which the federal enforcers  are located in the Justice  Department, federal  "prosecu-
tors" often are not officials in the Department  ofJustice; the Department of Labor,
for example, is the agency authorized to bring suit to enforce the FLSA.  While efforts
to influence Department ofJustice officials may be viewed as particularly inappropri-
ate,  officials  in an  executive  agency like the  Department of Labor routinely are in-
volved in discussion  with both regulatees and with "political" actors in the Executive
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ilarity  is particularly likely if one  agrees,  as I  do, with  Larry Kramer
that the political  safeguards  today  are  strongly  buttressed by, if not
primarily  located in,  a  complex  web  of extra-constitutional  political
institutions  (like political parties and organizations representing state
and local governments)  and complex connections among officials  in
parties,  organizations,  and the various  levels of governments.56  And
indeed, only recently President Clinton promulgated an Executive Or-
der-albeit, according  to newspaper reports,  as a defensive  effort to
forestall  more  far-reaching  legislation 57-designed  to  ensure,  inter
alia, that actions  taken by the executive branch do not limit the poli-
cymaking  discretion  of the states except as  necessary  and only after
consultation  with  state and local  officials. 58
Whether or not the Executive Order is a wise measure, it does not
create any rights or immunities that are judicially enforceable-much
less immunities that are constitutionally protected from revision in the
ordinary political  process.59  Indeed, one  could view the new Execu-
Office of the President or on Capitol Hill.  In that environment, agency officials may
not infrequently be wary of suing a state, not so much because of an abstract respect
for state "dignity," but rather because they may have been subjected to, or fear becom-
ing subject to, political pressure-whether directly from the states themselves, or indi-
rectly  through  the  intervention  of  other  government  officials  who  in  turn  are
responding to state pressure.
Having said  this,  I would note that my phrasing in text-that the political safe-
guards  may  operate  in  "broadly similar  fashion"  on  legislative  and  executive  offi-
cials-is  not inconsistent  with  the  view,  which  I would  espouse,  that the  political
culture  of members of the House and  the Senate,  and of their staffs,  is in  general
more responsive  to political pressure from states than is that of officials in executive
agencies.  In that respect, the political safeguards may be more robust in the legisla-
tive than in the executive branch.  In other respects, however, the political safeguards
may be more effective in forestalling federal litigation than in forestalling federal leg-
islation:  in the legislative process, states may be less likely to have advance  notice that
adverse  action is about to be taken, whereas a government lawsuit is likely to follow a
crystallized dispute known to state officials; moreover, identification of a single critical
decisionmaker with control over executive enforcement may be easier than identifica-
tion in Congress of a particular legislator who plainly has the power to control a legis-
lative  outcome.
More  broadly, however,  Caminker and I agree that, however  one  describes the
behavior of executive  enforcement officials, the Court in Alden fails to offer a convinc-
ing reason for permitting only federal officials to seek retrospective damages liability
against unconsenting states for their violation of federal laws enacted under Article I.
56  See Larry  Kramer,  Understanding  Federalism, 47 V~AN.  L. Rv.  1485,  1522-60
(1994).
57  Stephen  Laboton,  Anti-Federalism Measures Have Bipartisan  Support, N.Y. TiMss,
Sept. 6,  1999,  at A12.
58  Exec.  Order No.  13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255  (1999).
59  See id. § 11.
[VOIL.  75:3 1024STATE  SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY
five Order, and the congressional  activity that may have stimulated it,
as  evidence  that the political  safeguards  retain some potency.  Over
time, one might expect that in some periods or in some federal agen-
cies, state and local officials will have very limited influence in execu-
tive  branch  decisions,  while  in  other  periods  or  agencies  their
influence will be stronger-perhaps  in some instances, so strong as to
steer federal officials away from important national action that should
be taken.60  The contrast between the ebb and flow of such forces and
the Alden ruling is striking.  For under Alden, even after both Houses
of Congress  and  the  President have  overcome  state  resistance  and
joined in  a clear statement  creating federal  rights  against the state,
those rights may be fully enforced only if subsequent administrations
are so inclined in the face of resource  constraints and possible  ongo-
ing  opposition from  state  and local  governments.  Alden precludes
Congress and the President from enacting legislation that makes avail-
able  a very  traditional  form  of redress-private  suits  for  damages
against the regulated  entity-when that remedy is  thought desirable
in order  to guarantee  an ongoing and politically insulated  basis for
full enforcement of federal law.  The preclusion of that remedy seems
to cut against, rather than in favor of, political accountability.
Indeed, one  can say more broadly  that the course  of sovereign
immunity decisions  of the Burger  and Rehnquist  Courts  represents
more of an obstacle  to than a reaffirmation of notions  of democratic
accountability.  The example  of the FLSA itself is  noteworthy.  Con-
gress first enacted the statute in 1938,61 and nearly thirty years later, in
1966, extended the Act to cover certain public employees for the first
time.  After a 1973 Supreme Court decision held that the 1966 amend-
ments had not purported to lift the states'  Eleventh Amendment im-
munity,62  Congress  in  1974 again  amended  the FLSA to make clear
that suits  like that in  Alden could be filed  in either state  or federal
court, and at the same time broadened the Act's coverage  of public
employees.63  But Alden,  coupled  with  Seminole Tribe, tells  Congress
that if it is  serious  about retrospective  enforcement  of liabilities,  it
must amend the FLSA still again so as to authorize some combination
of (a) private injunctive actions,  (b) damage actions against state offi-
cials  personally,  and  (c)  increased  federal  enforcement  capacity-
60  See generally DAVID  L. SHAPmO,  FEDERALISM:  A DALOGUE  107-40  (1995).
61  See 29  U.S.C.  § 201  (1994 & Supp.  1I  1998).
62  See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411  U.S. 279,  283  (1973).
63  See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C  § 216(b)  (1994).
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and, if the last approach is to be effective, must vastly increase appro-
priations to  the Department of Labor year after year.
The net result of the Court's decision  in Alden thus seems  to be
that  Congress  may  regulate  the  states,  but in  the  end will  lack  the
practical  tools necessary to  do so  with  maximum effectiveness.  One
can argue about whether the shortcomings  in the alternatives  to pri-
vate damage actions against the states leave the enforcement glass half
full or half empty.  But the Court never explains what sense it makes
"for states to be subject to federal regulation [under the FLSA]  but to
enjoy immunity with  respect  to major techniques  of enforcement  of
that regulation. '64  Indeed,  there  is  some  considerable  tension  be-
tween  the  Court's  arguments  that  (a)  even  without  private  suits
against state treasuries,  federal  enforcement will not suffer, and  (b)
those  private  suits are  so  distinctively  offensive  or intrusive  as  to be
unconstitutional.
The  Alden decision  also  raises a question about whether private
damage  actions  against local  governments  will  be treated  differently
from those  against states.65  Under the Eleventh  Amendment,  local
governments, unlike state governments  or their agencies, have no im-
munity from suit in federal court.66  That distinction, though peculiar
in many respects,  is well-entrenched.  Indeed, the Alden opinion relies
on it in distinguishing  Howlett v.  Rose67 -a  decision that had  recog-
nized a state court's obligation to entertain a damage action against a
school board-on  the  ground  that the  defendant  there  was not an
arm  of the state but merely a local government  and as such  had no
immunity from damages liability.68  But while the Alden Court thus re-
affirmed  the  state/local  distinction,  the Court's  reasoning  may ulti-
mately work to undermine it.  For the immunity that Alden recognized
was based not on the Eleventh Amendment  (whose text is limited to
suits in federal court and to suits against states)  but on broader princi-
64  HART &  WECHSLER'S  1999  SUPPLEMENT,  supra note *, at 136.
65  See id. Professor Jackson puts the question another way: Why, if local govern-
ments have no  11th Amendment immunity, should they be protected by related prin-
ciples  of  federalism  (specifically,  the  anti-commandeering  rule  of  Printz)?  See
Jackson,  supra note  1, at 2194.
66  On the origins of this distinction, see RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR.,  DANIELJ.  MELT-
ZER, &  DAVID  L.  SHAPIRO,  HART &  WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL  COURTS AND THE  FEDERAL
SYsTEM  1056-57  (4th  ed.  1996)  [hereinafter  HART  &  WECHSLER'S  THE  FEDERAL
CouRS].
67  496 U.S.  356  (1990).
68  See Alden, 119  S. Ct. at 2259.  Howlett also relied  on the ground  that the state
court's unwillingness to entertain a federal law action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983  (1994),
while entertaining analogous state law claims  against local school boards, constituted
unlawful discrimination against federal  rights.  See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378-81.
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ples of immunity said to be rooted in constitutional structure and re-
inforced by the Tenth  Amendment.69  (No longer  can one  say that
"the  [Tenth A]mendment  states but a truism."70)  The same sources
ur  iderlay  the anti-commandeering  decision  in Printz-which recog-
nized  a form  of constitutional immunity extending  to local  govern-
ments and their officials, and in so doing declared that the distinction
between  states  and  municipalities  "is  peculiar  to  the  question  of
whether  a  governmental  entity  is  entitled  to  Eleventh  Amendment
sovereign immunity" and has no bearing on "the question of whether
a governmental entity is protected by the Constitution's guarantees of
federalism,  including  the Tenth Amendment."71  Indeed,  the  Alden
Court in turn relied on Printz as support for the proposition that "our
federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consis-
tent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants  in
the governance of the Nation."72  And moving from precedent to pol-
icy, it is a familiar point that the litany of values associated with feder-
alism, particularly  those  related  to  political  participation,  often are
most fully realized by local rather  than by state governments.73  One
wonders whether  one  of the few limits on  state sovereign immunity
that the Court has consistently observed-that it shields only the state
or arms of the state, and not local governments-will be maintained.74
III.  IMMUN=IY  AND  THE VALUES  OF FEDERALISM
The issue presented in Alden-when may states  claim immunity
in  their  own  courts from  federal  suit-had never  been squarely  re-
solved;75  no constitutional text addresses it; the constitutional history,
as the warring opinions in Alden demonstrated, was hardly uniform or
69  See Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2247, 2259.
70  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,  124  (1941).
71  Printz, 521  U.S. at 931  n.15.  Although  the  majority in  Printz gave  the  10th
Amendment only a bit part, two members of the majority made that provision more
central to  the reasoning in their concurring opinions.  See id. at 935  (O'Connor, J.,
concurring);  id. at 936-39  (Thomas, J., concurring).
72  Alden,  119 S. Ct. at 2259.
73  For an example of this argument, see Richard Briffault,  "Wat About the 'sm'?"
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism 47 VAN.  L. REV.  1303,  1311
(1994).
74  Thus, for example,  Richard  Seamon-who  agrees  with the  Alden Court that
states should generally be immune in their own courts from private suit under federal
law, and who would base that immunity on the 10th Amendment and the anti-com-
mandeering principle-argues that the immunity should extend to suits against local
governments.  See Richard Seamon,  The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts,
37  BRANDEIS  L.J. 318,  389-90  (1998-99).
75  See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 57.
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clear;  and  precedents  could  be  adduced-and  distinguished-on
both sides of the issue.76  When facing such an issue, the Court might
appropriately  consider not merely a decision's  consequences  for the
effectiveness  of  federal  regulation  and  the  range  of  enforcement
choices open to Congress,  but also the extent to which that decision
fits with  the values underlying  a federal structure.  Those values have
been recited in prior decisions and extensive  commentary and are al-
most mind-numbingly familiar:77  facilitating political participation in
smaller units;  permitting a  closer match  of citizen  preferences  and
governmental policy than is available at the national level, thereby fos-
tering citizen  choice  and inter-jurisdictional  competition;  providing
opportunities  for experimentation  as well as  for diverse  approaches;
and providing a set of political counterweights to the national govern-
ment so  as  to prevent tyranny.  Critics  of Alden might question  this
litany, expressing  doubts  about whether  all of the functional  values
associated  with federalism  should be viewed  as having  constitutional
roots,78  whether those values are promoted by federalism  as much as
by localism and decentralization  (which could be promoted by a uni-
tary, national government),79 and whether in any event opposing val-
ues favor national  and uniform solutions.80  But even if one  simply
accepts the conventional  litany, one would still want to ask whether it
supports  the  doctrinal  pattern  with  which  we  are  left  after  Alden-
permitting federal imposition  of duties on a "state qua statd'8' but at
76  Elaborate discussions of the precedents are found in the parties' briefs in Alden
and in a number of law review articles.  See,  e.g.,  Ellen  D. Katz,  State  Judges, State Of-
ficers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe  and Printz, 1998 Wis. L. REv.  1465;
Seamon, supra note 74; VWzquez,  supra note 36; Louis  E. Wolcher,  Sovereign Immunity
and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts  for Constitutional
Violations, 69 CALIF. L.  REV. 189  (1981); Ann Woolhandler,  Old Property, New Property,
and Sovereign Immunity, 75  NORE DAME  LAW  REVIEW  919  (2000).
77  See,  e.g.,  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.  898, 919-21  (1997);  Gregory v. Ash-
croft, 501  U.S. 452,  457-60  (1991);  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,  469
U.S. 528, 568-72  (1985)  (Powell, J., dissenting).  See generally SHAPIRO,  supra  note 60.
78  Cf Samuel  H. Beer,  Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 AM.
POL. Sc.  REV.  9, 15 (1978)  (noting that the convention and ratification  debates made
little of the argument that federalism helps to accommodate  levels of government to
territorial diversity).
79  See, e.g.,  Adler & Kreimer, supra note 1, at 77 (citing additional sources);  Brif-
fault, supra  note 73; Malcolm Feeley,  The Fundamentality  and Irrelevance of  Federalism, 13
GA.  ST.  U.  L.  REv.  1009  (1997); Jackson,  supra note 1, at 2213-14, 2217-28  (citing
additional  sources;  Edward  L. Rubin  & Malcolm  Feeley,  Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41  UCLA L.  REV.  903  (1994).
80  For a masterful exposition of the arguments on both sides of the question, see
SHAPMIRO,  supra note 60.
81  National League of Cities  v. Usery, 426 U.S.  833, 847  (1976).
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the same  time barring enforcement  of those  duties  through  private
damage actions against those same state entities.
Of the litany of federalism values,  the two  to which the Court's
federalism decisions have given the greatest prominence are (1) main-
taining political accountability-presumably  so as to permit effective
electoral control of both levels of government as well as a transparent
competition  for political  allegiance-and  (2)  preventing  tyranny.82
Of these  two,  the political  accountability  concern  has been  the pri-
mary basis for the anti-commandeering  decisions.  And perhaps if,  as
Garcia suggested,  protection  of state  autonomy  is  going to rest sub-
stantially on the political process, that protection requires  clear lines
of accountability (although the Court's position that such accountabil-
ity is impaired by federal commandeering of state and local legislative
and executive processes has been forcefully contested).83
Whether or not the anti-commandeering  argument in the end is
convincing, no similar argument could support the result in  Alden.8 4
82  See Printz, 521  U.S. at 920-23  (political accountability);  id. at 921  (prevention
of tyranny); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (political accountability);  id. at 552 (prevention
of tyranny);  New York v.  United States,  505  U.S.  144,  168-69  (1992)  (political  ac-
countability);  id. at 181  (prevention  of tyranny);  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501  U.S.  452,
473  (1991)  (political accountability);  id. at 458-59  (prevention of tyranny).
The relative emphasis on these considerations is no surprise, as the other consid-
erations  typically put forward-matching  preferences,  permitting citizen choice and
exit, permitting social experimentation-have  less to do with federal regulation of the
states  themselves  than with  locating governmental  regulation of private  actors and
governmental  spending decisions  at some  sub-national  level of government.  More-
over, the  persuasiveness  of these other considerations  depends  upon  a complex of
empirical and shifting factors  (should the national government permit greater  flexi-
bility  in  income  maintenance  arrangements,  or  is  redistribution  a  distinctively
national responsibility;, do the values of uniform national standards outweigh the ben-
efits  of experimentation  in a specific  areas?)  particularly unsuited to judicial evalua-
tion.  Accord  Andrej  Rapaczynski,  From  Sovereignty  to  Process:  The Jurisprudence of
Federalism  After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.  341,  409.
83  See Adler  & Kreimer,  supra note  1, at 98-102;  Caminker,  supra note  1,  at
1061-72;  Caminker, supra note 14, at 220-31; Jackson,  supra note  1, at 2195-2205.
84  Probably the key difficulty for any theory that seeks tojustify the anti-comman-
deering principle is to explain why commandeering is more constitutionally offensive
than the recognized  power to preempt state regulation altogether.  Several commen-
tators have explored whether one mightjustify a distinction between commandeering
and preemption based on notions that mandated action is more offensive than man-
dated inaction.  See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supra  note 1, at 93; Caminker, supra note 1,
at 1055 n.218.
With regard  to the goal  of tyranny prevention, Adler and Kreimer suggest  that
although, at first blush, liberty may be more threatened by government action than by
inaction, in the end that claim is unpersuasive.  See Alder & Kreimer,  supra note 1, at
98-101.  Moreover, the suggested  distinction assumes that the alternative  to federal
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Imagine  the objections that a contrary  result in Alden would,  to use
the current idiom, have  commandeered  the state courts,  constituted
commandeering  of the states is  the absence of regulation;  it may, instead, be direct
federal regulation  with a larger federal apparatus and the absence  of state participa-
tion that might otherwise have served as a counterweight to federal  overreaching.  See
Caminker, supra note 1, at 1014.
With  respect to the  value of promoting local political  communities, Adler and
Kreimer also note the "sense" that commandeering  "seems, somehow, to be more of
an interference with state autonomy than a requirement that they refrain from enact-
ing a particular statute."  Adler and Kreimer, supra note 1, at 94.  In the end, however,
they conclude that neither  that intuitive sense  nor consideration  of other values of
federalism can justify the preemption/commandeering  distinction, noting that either
technique limits the options available to self-governing  political communities.  See id.
at 95-101.
With  regard  to  the  value  of political  accountability,  if federal commandeering
risks misallocation of responsibility from federal to state officials for actions the latter
undertake  only under federal compulsion,  so federal preemption  risks misallocation
of responsibility  from  federal  to  state  officials  for  the latter's  failure  to  undertake
action  that federal law prohibits.  See  id. at 99; Caminker, supra note  1, at 1061-74;
Jackson,  supra note 1, at 2200-05.
Rick Hills has defended an anti-commandeering rule in part as preventing forced
speech  and in part on a complicated functional  argument about when federal com-
pulsion  of states,  as distinguished  from federal  purchase of services  from states,  is
required.  See Hills, supra note 1.  The argument about compelled speech, it seems to
me,  also  fails to  distinguish  preemption:  if commandeering  is  forced speech,  then
preemption  is suppression  of speech,  which should be equally suspect.  Hills's  com-
plex functional  argument is based on the  view  that the  government should  have to
purchase rather than commandeer state regulatory services, and that doing so will not
impair national policy.  While the argument is nuanced and sophisticated, at bottom
it remains  quite uncertain  that it adequately distinguishes  commandeering from pre-
emption  (which in theory could also be purchased).  SeeAdler & Kreimer,  supra  note
1, at 101-02.
Finally, it is not clear that Hills's general argument about commandeering is par-
ticularly apt with regard to the rule of Alden.  It is hard to think of a requirement that
state judges  articulate and  enforce  federal law-whether  in private  suits or in suits
against the states-as  "compelled speech"-particularly  since their obligation  to en-
gage  in  such  "compelled  speech" when  federal  law arises  by  way of defense seems
uncontroversial.  Nor, as he recognizes,  see Hills, supra note  1, at 928-33,  is his con-
cern about federal expropriation  of state services limited to a federal obligation  that
state courts entertain  suits against the states;  the concern is equally applicable to the
long-recognized obligation  of state courts  to entertain federal actions against private
parties  when  they entertain analogous  state law  actions.  See,  e.g.,  Testa  v. Katt,  330
U.S. 396 (1946).  He does suggest that perhaps  Testa is misguided and that the Madis-
onian  Compromise-under  which Congress need  not create inferior federal  courts
and  may instead  rely on  state courts  to  entertain federal claims-should  be  under-
stood as requiring Congress to purchase the services of state courts.  That is a quite
different argument from the Court's, and one that seems to me, even accepting each
step of his rather  complicated functional argument, a doubtful interpretation of the
Constitution.  See also infra note 85.
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an unfunded mandate, diverted state judicial-  energy from state agen-
das, and confused voters about whom to blame for either (a) the way
state courts  allocate  resources,  or  (b)  decisions enforcing  the FLSA
against state governments.8 5  Those objections would be no more ger-
mane  to the facts of Alden than to a myriad  of other federal obliga-
tions  that state  courts  constitutionally must discharge.  It is  nothing
short  of  fanciful  to  think  that  state  political  accountability  is
threatened  by requiring state  courts  to add damage  actions  against
state treasuries  to the set of federal actions that they must otherwise
entertain-for example, suits of all types against local governments;86
suits  to enjoin  state officials  from  ongoing violations  of federal  law;
federal  claims against private  defendants  or against state officials  in
their personal capacities  (at least so long as states entertain analogous
state law claims);87 and suits against states that have waived immunity
in order to gain federal funding.8  When a state court issues a deci-
sion  that a  state  or local  government  is  violating  federal  law,  one
doubts that state voters seeking to allocate responsibility will focus on
the identity of the plaintiff  (private party or the United States),  the
defendant  (state government, local  government, or officials),  or the
nature of the relief  (prospective vs. retrospective).  Nor, for that mat-
85  See Caminker, supra  note 1, at 1051-53; Seamon,  supra  note 74, at 359.  In this
vein, Professor Merritt has argued that federal commandeering consumes state polit-
ical energy in a way that federal preemption does not.  See DeborahJ. Merritt, Federal-
ism as  Empowerment, 47 U. FLA.  L. REV. 541, 553-55  (1995).  The point is undoubtedly
true insofar as it ordinarily is easier to do nothing than to do something.  Whether or
not that observation relates importantly to notions of federalism is a different matter;,
requiring  state  motor vehicle  officials  to report information  to  federal  authorities
seems less intrusive to state self-governance than does preempting all state motor vehi-
cle regulation.  Indeed, the observation may be particularly inapt when applied to the
judiciary,  one  of whose  distinguishing features  is  its  lack  of power to  set its  own
agenda,  thus requiring that it devote  its adjudicative  energy to  a set of tasks  estab-
lished by others.
86  I assume existing law under which sovereign immunity does not extend to such
actions.  But cf supra text accompanying notes  65-74.
87  See HART  & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL  COURTS,  supra note  66, at 469-91.  In-
deed, application of the anti-commandeering principle to state judges would be hard
to  square  with  the  one  clear implication  of cases  like  Testa v.  Katt,  330  U.S.  386
(1947)-that state courts may not refuse to entertain federal actions when they enter-
tain analogous state law actions.  The majority in Printz, by contrast, was unconcerned
with whether state and local executive  officials administered analogous state laws; the
bar on federal compulsion of executive  officials in Printz, rather, was unqualified.  See
Printz, 521  U.S.  at 935.
88  For a post-Alden  decision  re-affirming  congressional  power to  condition  the
award of federal  funds upon a state's waiver of sovereign  immunity from suit with
regard  to  the funded  activities-and  thus upholding  private  suit against  a state  in
federal court-see Litman v.  George Mason University, 186 F.3d 544  (4th Cir. 1999).
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ter, are voters likely to be concerned with whether Congress was legis-
lating  under  Article  I  or  under  Section  5  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment-or  perhaps  even  with whether  challenged  action  vio-
lated state or federal law.
Indeed, if damage  actions against state treasuries  threaten  polit-
ical accountability, state agendas,  and state resource decisions, that is
just as true of the numerous suits in which federal law supplies not the
plaintiff's  claim  but rather  a defense  or a  procedural  requirement
(from constitutional limits on criminal  prosecutions  to limits on per-
sonal jurisdiction  to  statutory or  constitutional defenses  to state law
liability).  A state court's  obligation  to apply Eighth Amendment law
in a death penalty case,  or the actual malice  rule in a defamation  ac-
tion, can consume considerable judicial resources, thus diverting state
courts from other tasks; federal law may control the outcome in a way
that could,  in  theory, lead  voters  to  hold  state judges  accountable
merely for carrying out federal obligations.  And in cases with federal
defenses, no less than in cases in which federal law supplies the claim,
Congress  could have vested jurisdiction  in the federal courts by pro-
viding  for removal  once  the  federal  defense  was  raised.  But it has
long been  clear that Congress may "commandeer" the state courts to
apply federal  law and need not instead give federal  courts  exclusive
jurisdiction  over  every  case  or controversy arising under federal  law
within  the meaning of Article  III.
Indeed, the entire political accountability argument seems like a
fish  out of water  as applied  to state judges.  While  most are  indeed
elected,8 9 they are not meant to be politically accountable in the same
way as state legislative and executive officials.  (Imagine the campaign
slogan:  "Put Smith  on  the  State  Supreme  Court:  She'll  Defy  the
Supremacy  Clause.")
So much  for  political  accountability.  As  for whether  immunity
from  state treasury  liability is  necessary to  prevent tyranny, we  must
begin with the fact that the A/den decision, although it does not even
cite  Garcia, plainly  accepts  that  Congress  has legislative  authority  to
impose FLSA regulation  upon state governments and to enforce that
liability through techniques other than private suit against the states.
Thus, judicial enforcement of federal fair labor standards does not so
cripple the states as to prevent them  (1)  from representing  (or from
serving as the basis for organizing) groups (whether insular minorities
or dispersed majorities)  that are left out of the national political pro-
89  See, e.g., Steven Croley,  The Majoritarian  Difficulty: ElectiveJudiciares  and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI.  L. REv.  689,  690  (1995).
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cess, or  (2)  from combating capture  of the federal government by a
special interest distinct from that of the people.90
More complete enforcement  of the FLSA, to be sure, would im-
pose additional burdens on the states-burdens  thatJustice Kennedy
described in rather draconian  terms.  He raised the specter that pri-
vate  damage  actions  could  "threaten  the  financial  integrity  of the
State"91 and "create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and
leverage over the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional
design";92  were the states not immune from private suits, "the course
of their public  policy and the administration  of their public  affairs"
may become  "subject to and controlled by the mandates  of judicial
tribunals."93  Familiar  responses  exist to  all  of these  objections:  the
burdens  (staggering is surely an exaggeration  of what was at issue in
Alden) exist by virtue of congressional mandates whose constitutional-
ity  Garcia affirms;  the  cost  of ongoing  compliance  with the  federal
law-whether through  "voluntary"  decisions  like that of the state  of
Maine, after the Alden litigation was filed, to alter its future conduct,
or in  other instances  through  adherence  to prospective  injunctions
issued at the behest of private suitors-is likely over time to far exceed
the cost of remedying  past violations;94 and private  damage  actions
against  local  governments  have  long  existed  without  transforming
them into pawns of the judiciary.95  Ultimately, as the dissent empha-
90  See generally Rapaczynski,  supra note  82, at 380-95.
91  Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
92  Id.
93  Id  (quoting In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887));  see also Seamon, supra note
74, at 366-72.
94  Indeed, National  League of Cities itself was a suit by governmental plaintiffs seek-
ing to enjoin the application to them of the FLSA, and the Court, in upholding their
position, placed  considerable weight on the cost and associated  burdens of ongoing
compliance with the FISA.  See National  League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846.
95  Moreover,  the Supreme  Court has  required state  courts  to  entertain private
damage actions against unconsenting states that are of far greater consequence than
the  Alden litigation.  In this respect,  Reich v.  Collins, 513  U.S.  106  (1994),  was  an
awkward  precedent for the Alden Court.  In Reich, the Court unanimously reaffirmed
that absent an adequate predeprivation  remedy, a state court must provide a refund
remedy when taxpayers  challenge  the constitutionality of state taxation-"the sover-
eign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding."  Id. at
110.  It is hard to square  that precedent-and cases in that line that have  required
refunds that sometimes  reach hundreds of millions of dollars,  see, e.g.,  Harper v. Vir-
ginia Dep't of Taxation,  509 U.S. 86, 129  (1993)-with the Court's concern in Alden
that suit by Maine probation officers could "turn the State against itself and ultimately
commandeer  the  entire political  machinery of the  State  against its  will and at the
behest of individuals," Alden, 119 S. Ct.  at 2264.
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sized,96  any incremental  burden  imposed  by damages  liability  is  re-
quired by the rule of law and materializes  only when states do not live
up to federal obligations  that have constitutionally been imposed.  It
would be an odd constitutional theory that Congress may constitution-
ally regulate  state labor standards  only if federal law  is not very well
enforced.
Reich posed a difficulty for the  Alden Court in  two additional ways.  First, Reich
recognizes the power and obligation of the Supreme Court, even when acting without
a congressional  clear statement, to require state courts to impose retrospective liabil-
ity on  state  governments.  (Efforts  to re-cast  Reich and McKesson  Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages &  Tobacco, 496 U.S.  18  (1990),  as requiring only a remedy against
state  officials,  rather  than  against  the  state-see,  e.g.,  Seamon,  supra note  74,  at
394-406; Vizquez,  supra note 36, at 1770-77-seem to me unpersuasive, and, in any
event, the Alden Court did not follow that line.)  One might have thought that imposi-
tion  of retrospective  liability  on state  treasuries should  be more, not less,  tolerable
when, as in Alden, it was plainly authorized by the federal political branches.  Cf John
E. Nowak,  The Scope of Congressional  Power to Create Causes of  Action Against State Govern-
ment and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth  Amendments, 75  CoLuM.  L. REv.  1413
(1975);  Laurence  H. Tribe,  Intergovernmental  Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers  Issues in Controversies  About Federalism,  89  HARV.  L. REV.
682  (1976).
Second,  Reich cannot be accommodated  to the majority's  theoretical  construct.
In order to circumvent the textual limitation of the  11  th Amendment to federaljudi-
cial power, the Alden Court reasoned as follows: (a) "the Constitution was understood,
in light of its history and structure, to preserve  the States'  traditional immunity from
private suits,"  Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2252;  (b)  Chisholm v.  Georgia, 2  U.S.  (2  Dall.)  419
(1793),  mistakenly interpreted Article  III as having stripped states of immunity from
suit in federal court, seeAlden, 119 U.S. at 2252-53;  (c)  "[a]s  the [lth] Amendment
clarified  the  only provisions  of the  Constitution  [Article  III]  that  anyone had  sug-
gested might support a contrary understanding, there was no reason to draft with a
broader brush," id. at 2252;  (d) state sovereign  immunity therefore derives  not from
the  11th  Amendment  (which  is  treated  as  having  merely  corrected  the  error  of
Chisholm) but from the basic constitutional design, see id. at 2254.  On this theory, the
scope of the immunities that states enjoy in state and federal courts should be identi-
cal,  as they derive  from the  same source  in  constitutional history and  structure-a
point that the Court's opinion acknowledged.  See id. at 2256 ("The  logic of the deci-
sions  [denying  that Congress has power to  abrogate  state sovereign immunity from
private suit in federal  court]  ...  does not turn on the forum in which the suits were
prosecuted  but extends to state-court suits as well.").  However, the Court has squarely
held that the  11th Amendment bars a federal action  by a taxpayer for a refund from
the state  treasury of taxes  alleged to have been unconstitutionally  exacted.  See, e.g.,
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).  The contrasting federal and
state  decisions  on whether  a state is  immune from  tax refund  suits thus belies the
Court's premise in Alden that there is a uniform  immunity, rooted  in the  Constitu-
tion-and  restored  in  federal  court  actions  (after  the  constitutional  heresy  of
Chisholm) by the 11th Amendment-applicable  wherever a state is sued by a private
party.
96  Alden, 119 S.  Ct. at 2288-89 & n.34  (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Court  offers no convincing reason  to believe that the
additional  burdens  of private  enforcement  against  state  treasuries
would undercut the capacity of states to compete for the political alle-
giance of citizens  or to serve as a counterweight against national tyr-
anny.  Indeed,  those  capacities  of states  are  hardly  promoted  by a
constitutional  ruling that-insofar as  Congress  wishes  to make  state
employers  liable  to  state  employees  for FLSA violations-privileges
enforcement  by an  (expanded) federal bureaucracy  (whose lawsuits
in practice would likely be filed exclusively in federal court) over pri-
vate  enforcement  in  state court.97
Put differently, the  Garcia decision entrusted protection of state
autonomy primarily to the national political process, supplemented by
a subsequently-announced  rule  of clear statement designed to ensure
that state interests were  duly considered  by Congress. 9  The  debate
over what exactly those safeguards are, how they operate, and whether
they adequately protect the states is well-known.99 But so long as those
safeguards are deemed presumptively adequate with regard to the im-
position of FLSA liability generally on state employers in the first in-
stance,100  there is no reason to think them insufficient with regard to
97  Of course,  the  Court in Printz was unmoved  by any  suggestion that federal
"commandeering"  of state executive  officials  to administer federal  law-when  com-
pared to the alternative of exclusive federal administration-might improve local par-
ticipation and governmental responsiveness to local problems,  "make valuable use of'
the distinctive perspectives  of state officials, and promote  diversity and experimenta-
tion.  See Caminker, supra note 1, at 1014.  Indeed, similar rationales for relying on
state implementation of federal directives underlay the scheme of the Articles of Con-
federation.  SeeJack N. Rakove,  The Origins  ofJudicial  Reiew: A Plea  for  New Contexts, 49
STAN.  L. REv. 1031,  1043-44 (1997).  That that scheme did not work well as the exclu-
sive  basis for national  action in  the chaotic and embryonic stages  of nation-building
following the Revolutionary War hardly demonstrates that it would not be a useful, if
relatively uncommon, mode of national action more than two centuries later.  See, e.g.,
Caminker,  supra note 1, at 1046.
98  See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61  (1991).  Needless to say, there is
considerable  tension between Justice  O'Connor's opinion for the  Court in  Gregory
and the  Garcia  opinion, from which she dissented.  SeeYoo,  supra  note 28, at 1335-40
(contending that  Gregory rejects  the underlying  tenets of Garcia).
99  See generally Kramer,  supra note 56.
100  There  is, indeed, evidence  that the political safeguards  of federalism have,  in
some cases, helped state and local governments  to secure their objectives  in the na-
tional political process.  In  1985,  following the  Garcia decision,  Congress amended
the  FLSA to permit state  and  local  governmental  employers  (unlike  their private
counterparts)  to provide compensatory time-off rather than premium compensation
for employees who work  overtime.  See Fair Labor Standards Amendments  of 1985,
Pub. L. No.  99-150, 99 Stat. 878  (1985)  (codified at 29  U.S.C.  § 207(o)(1)  (1994).
That same  act also  exempted  legislative  employees  from  protection, while  several
other provisions of the current law accommodate particular concerns of governmen-
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the  authorization  of damages  liability in private  ELSA  suits.  In  the
end, one  is hard  pressed  to see the  distinctive set of limits that the
Court has established,  and the national  powers  that it has preserved,
as responsive to or promoting any theory of constitutional federalism.
The  majority offered  one additional argument  that related in a
somewhat  different manner to conceptions  of constitutional federal-
ism.  It contended that its result was sound because the contrary result
would create  an anomaly-that federal rights could be fully enforced
in state but not in federal court.  The point is not without some force;
as  I  have  argued  before,' 0'  there  is  some  tension between  Seminole
Tribe (recognizing  an  insurmountable  Eleventh  Amendment  immu-
nity from federal court suit) and the dissenters'  position in Alden (re-
fusing to recognize  a commensurate  immunity from state court suit).
If states are to be liable for damages in private suits to enforce federal
laws, it is hard to see why federal courts should not hear those actions.
Seminole Tribe, however, had foreclosed that approach.  For some,
like  me, it is  the Court's interpretation  of the Eleventh Amendment
that  is anomalous.  But that interpretation  is, for the moment, well-
entrenched.  Against  that background, the  question becomes which
additional  anomaly is greater:  (1)  preserving congressional  authority
to  deploy private suits as a mechanism for enforcing federal law, but
only in state court, or  (2)  recognizing a non-textual immunity from
private  suit in all courts,  thereby truncating federal legislative  power
fully to  enforce valid congressional  duties.
My view  that the second  anomaly  is  the more  profound one  is
supported by the existence  of arguments  that it does make  sense  to
uphold state  court obligation  while  denying federal  court power  to
entertain  private  damage  actions.1 0 2  (Although these arguments  do
not persuade me that Seminole Tribe was correct, they seem to me well
short of being  anomalous.)  If one  starts  with  the  Court's view  that
state liability in private actions  is a particularly  sensitive  matter, one
might view the interposition of state judges as a useful buffer.'03  State
tal employers.  See, e.g.,  29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2) (C)  (1994)  (exempting certain positions
from overtime  requirements);  id. § 207(k)  (1994)  (establishing special overtime rules
for law enforcement personnel).  Needless to say, state and local government interests
do not always  prevail in Congress,  nor has the national  legislative process  always fo-
cused very clearly on whether federal regulation should extend to state and local gov-
ernments.  See generally Carol F. Lee,  The Political  Safeguards  of  Federalism? Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court  Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URn.  LAw 301  (1988).
101  See Meltzer,  supra note 9, at 57-59.
102  For an overlapping but somewhat different set of arguments, see Vicki C. Jack-
son,  The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
LJ. 1, 88-104  (1988).
103  See id. at 99-100.
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courts, one assumes, will be particularly sympathetic to state interests
and particularly likely to avail themselves of whatever flexibility federal
law provides  to avoid imposing untoward  burdens on  state political
branches.  Giving  states the right  to be  sued only in  courts  of their
own  creation  rather  than  in  those  of a  distinct sovereign-a  home
court  advantage  that, by its  nature,  is  not, possessed  by  other  liti-
gants-could be viewed  as  respecting their dignity and status.1 0 4  In-
deed,  two years  to the day earlier, Justice Kennedy, in his opinion in
Idaho v. Coeur dAlene Tribe,1 05 had said precisely that: "The dignity and
status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment
immunity and to  insist upon responding  to  these  claims in  its own
courts, which are  open to hear and determine  the case."' 06
Justice  Kennedy's  position  in  Coeur d'Alene  Tribe is  echoed  in
other jurisdictional doctrines.  Indeed, the arguments for reading the
Eleventh Amendment as giving the states an immunity only from fed-
eral  court  suit  underlie  the  various  abstention  doctrines  that  the
Supreme Court has established-doctrines  that deem it preferable  in
particular circumstances  to have federal issues litigated in state than
in federal court. 0 7  Similarly, the Johnson Act'08  and the Tax Injunc-
tion Act'0 9  channel  specified federal  causes  of action  exclusively  to
state court.  (The Tax Injunction Act echoes  Alden's concern about
the sensitivity  of judicial orders  that directly affect state  treasuries.)
Rather than viewing these jurisdictional arrangements  as anomalous,
the Court has embraced them with considerable  enthusiasm."1 0
104  See Hess v. Port Auth.  Trans-Hudson  Corp.,  513  U.S.  30, 41  (1994);  see also
Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279,  293-94  (1973)  (Marshall, J., concurring in result).
The issue is not the general immunity of the States from private suit-a ques-
tion of the common law-but merely the susceptibility  of the States to suit
before federal tribunals.  Because of the problems of federalism inherent in
making  one sovereign  appear against its will in  the  courts  of the  other, a
restriction  upon the  exercise  of the  federal judicial power has long been
considered to be appropriate  in a case such as this.
Id.
105  521 U.S. 261  (1997).
106  Id. at 287  (plurality opinion).
107  See  generally HART  & WEcnsizx:'s  Tim FEDERAL COURTS,  supra note  66,  at
1247-1308;  see, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37  (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315  (1943).
108  28 U.S.C. § 1342  (1994).
109  Id  § 1341  (1994).
110  The enthusiasm is particularly notable with regard to the  Younger doctrine,  see,
e.g.,  HART  & WECHSLER'S  Ti-E FEDERAL CoURTrs,  supra note 66, at 1256-75, and deci-
sions concerning the Tax Injunction Act,  see, e.g.,  id. at 1216-22.
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IV.  STATE  DIGNrrY  AND  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY
The Court did not, in fact, seek to justify its decision in Alden with
a careful  analysis of the  relationship  of the new immunity  it  recog-
nized  to  the  purposes  of  constitutional  federalism.  Instead,  the
Court's normative  defense  of state sovereign  immunity rested on two
somewhat more abstract notions:  the dignity of states and the sover-
eignty of states.
The notion that sovereign immunity protects the dignity of states
has  been  more prominent  in  decisions  of the  1990s  than it  was  in
earlier  decades."' 1  "Congress,"  the  Court  declares  in  Alden,  "must
In any event, the majority's approach  creates other anomalies.  One that David
Shapiro  pointed  out to  me  can  be made  concrete  with  this  hypothetical:  Suppose
Nevada employees were to spend several months living in California to study the oper-
ation of its public university  system.  If the employees  work more  than  40 hours a
week and Nevada denies them overtime pay,  Seminole Tribe indicates that they cannot
sue Nevada  in a federal  court, and  Alden now adds that they likewise  cannot sue in
Nevada state court.  However, under Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979),  they may be
able to sue the state of Nevada in California state court.  My hypothetical  can be dis-
tinguished from Hal, where the claim against Nevada was based on California tort law
rather than on federal law,  but the position that Nevada  has greater immunity from
federal law than from the law of a sister state seems  impossible to justify.
In  the example  given,  the constitutionality  of California's  exercise  of personal
jurisdiction  would  not seem  to  be in  doubt,  given  the ample  "minimum contacts"
between  the defendant state of Nevada and the forum state of California.  And more
generally, if state lines are  not themselves  of significance  in  restricting  the federal
government  when  establishing  personal jurisdiction  over  civil cases  in  the  federal
courts,  see HART  & WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL  COURTS,  supra note 66, at 1587-88, it is
far from  clear that they  should hamper the  federal government in  authorizing the
exercise of personal jurisdiction  by state courts over  those same federal civil claims.
If there is a theory that would support this set of results, it escapes me.  Of course,
of the six Justices in the Hall  majority, only Justice Stevens remains on the Court, and
the current ChiefJustice authored a sharp dissent in Hall; thus, perhaps that decision
will  be  the  next  victim  of  the  seemingly  relentiess  expansion  of  state  sovereign
immunity.
111  A Westlaw search, conducted on October 26, 1999, of the SCT  database  (which
extends back to 1945)  for the terms  ["Eleventh Amendment" and digniti]  turned up
a number of private suits against states, all decided after 1992:  Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 2240  (1999),  Idaho v.  Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521  U.S.  261  (1997),  Seminole Tribe v.
Forida, 517  U.S.  44  (1996),  Hess v.  Port Authority  Trans-Hudson Corp.,  513  U.S.  30
(1994),  and Puerto  Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf&Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139
(1993).
Only two other cases turned up by this search  even mention  protection of state
dignity  in connection  with state sovereign  immunity.  In  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at
416, the Court, in the course of rejecting a claim of sovereign  immunity, stated that
any protection Nevada could claim against suit in a California court must emanate not
from the  l1th Amendment but from "the voluntary decision of the second  [state]  to
respect  the  dignity of the  first  [state]  as a matter  of comity."  In  Petty v.  Tennessee-STATE  SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY
accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a federal
system,  one  beginning with  the  premise  of sovereignty  in  both  the
central Government  and the  separate  States."112  Ifideed,  Alden  de-
picts  state  dignity in more  unqualified terms  than state  sovereignty:
the  states  "retain  the  dignity,  though  not  the  full  authority,  of
sovereignty." ' 13
Appeals to dignity are somewhat evanescent; indeed, it is easy to
dismiss them out of hand by observing that states, unlike humans, lack
emotions and cannot suffer affronts."14  Perhaps, however, such a dis-
missal is a tad too quick.  Article HI itself reflects, in its Original Juris-
diction  Clause,  a  particular  concern  with  suits  to  which  states  are
parties, by vesting original jurisdiction over them in a court of special
dignity-the Supreme Court of the United States.1 5  Similarly, Con-
gress, for roughly the first two-thirds of this century, maintained aju-
risdictional  structure  that permitted  only  federal  district  courts  of
special dignity-composed of three judges-to entertain actions seek-
ing  to  enjoin  state  laws  as  unconstitutional."1 6  (Such actions  were
nominally  against  state  officers,  but  Congress  saw  through  the
form."17)  Still, neither of these jurisdictional recognitions of state dig-
Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S.  275 (1959),  the Court, in discussing the  Chisholm
decision,  quotes, in  a footnote, a secondary source that describes  the movement to
adopt the  l1th Amendment  as  motivated by  the desire  "to prevent subsequent af-
fronts to the dignity of states."  Id. at 276 n.1  (quoting MARIAN DoRis  IRISH  &JAMES
WARREN PROTHRO,  THE PoLmcs OF AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY  123 (1959)).  This passing
reference  was not of particular significance  in  Petty, where  the Court ruled that the
states  involved had  waived any immunity  by virtue  of their entry into an  interstate
compact; nothing in  the waiver analysis  turned on conceptions of state  dignity.
112  Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2268;  see also id. at 2263.
113  Id. at 2247 ( "[The Constitution]  reserves to  [the states]  a substantial portion
of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes
inhering in that status.").
114  See Michael  C. Doff,  The Limits of Socratic Deliberation,  112  HARV.  L. REV. 4, 61
(1998); Monaghan,  supra note 16, at 132.
115  See Daniel J.  Meltzer,  The History and Structure of Article 11,  138 U. PA. L. REV.
1569,  1598  (1990).
116  The  history is sketched  in  HART  & WEcHSL='S  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS,  supra
note 66, at 1212-15.
117  For discussion of formal versus functional elements in the Court's federalism
decisions,  see  Kathleen  M.  Sullivan,  Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term  Limits,  Inc.  v.
Thornton, 109  HARV.  L. REv. 78  (1995).  For a broader, if even  a bit overstated, cri-
tique of the Supreme Court's federalism decisions as formalistic, see Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Formalism  and Functionalism  in  Federalism  Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959  (1997).
Even the formal distinction between  injunctions against state  officers  (permissi-
ble under Exparte Young  209 U.S.  123 (1908))  and damage actions against state trea-
suries (forbidden by Alden and  Seminole Tribe) breaks down in practice.  Injunctions,
as Owen  Fiss noted, can  be viewed  as pinpointed  obligations  under the  governing
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nity freed states from full compliance with federal law;  instead, they
merely prevented state subjection to judicial orders by a single federal
judge.
The notion that respecting state dignity requires not merely regu-
lating the forum but also restricting congressional  power to authorize
private suit at all  is, however, difficult to integrate  with the American
constitutional  tradition. Justice Souter's dissent noted that the digni-
tary concept is  drawn from royal dignity'l" 8-hardly  a promising doc-
trinal  source  in  a  democratic  republic  based  on  sovereignty  of the
people and subject to legal-constitutional  constraints  (including, inci-
dentally, a prohibition on titles of nobility). 119  And more than a cen-
tury ago, Justice  Miller, in discussing  the  sovereign immunity  of the
United  States, dissected the dignitary rationale  in language  on which
it  is hard to  improve:
Nor can it be said that the government is degraded by appearing as
a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because it is constantly
appearing  as  a  party  in  such  courts,  and  submitting  its  rights  as
against the  citizen to their judgment....
Under our system  the people, who are there called  subjects, are
the sovereign.  Their rights, whether collective or individual, are not
bound  to  give  way  to  a sentiment  of loyalty to  the  person of the
monarch.  The citizen here knows no person, however near to those
in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield the
rights which  the  law  secures  to  him when  it is well  administered.
When he, in one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has estab-
lished his right to property, there is no reason why deference  to any
person, natural or artificial,  not even the United States, should pre-
vent him  from  using the  means which  the  law gives  him for  the
protection  and enforcement  of that right. 1 20
More  concretely,  broad  notions  of state  dignity are  difficult to
square  with  accepted  features  of constitutional  tradition.  Foremost
among these are the power of another sovereign  (the federal govern-
constitutional or statutory provisions.  See OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVL RIGHTS INjucNrION
32-37, 68-74, 80-81  (1978).  And the Court has held that violation of the pinpointed
obligations set forth in federal injunctions can lead to ajudicial levy against the public
fisc for contempt.  See Hutto  v. Finney, 437  U.S.  678  (1978);  see also supra note  48.
Why  state  dignity  requires immunity from general  statutory  duties  (no  matter how
clear) but not from pinpointed  obligations as specified in a court order is never ex-
plained.  Perhaps  the  Supreme  Court  is  more  concerned  about  adequate
enforcement  of judicial  directives  (injunctions)  than  of  congressional  directives
(statutes).
118  See Alden, 119 S.  Ct. at 2271-73.
119  See U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 10.
120  United States  v. Lee,  106  U.S.  196, 206,  208-09  (1882).
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ment)  to  impose unwanted  duties  (like those  of the  FLSA)  on  the
states, and the power  of that other sovereign  to strip  states  of their
regulatory authority via federal preemption.  State dignity is also com-
promised  by all  of the alternative  means  of judicial enforcement  of
federal duties that the majority mentions as valid (perhaps most nota-
bly, by state subjection  to injunctions entered nominally against state
officials),  and by the manifold prohibitions and duties set forth in Ar-
ticle I Section 10, in Article IV, and in Amendments  13-15, 19, 24 and
26 to the Constitution.
If all of these burdens and accepted  powers are  consistent with
state  dignity, what,  exactly,  is it about  private  damage  actions  that
grates?  Perhaps it is the notion that if private parties can sue states for
damages,  nothing is  left of a  conception  of state  sovereign  immu-
nity-much as the Court was concerned in Lopez that if the Gun Free
School Zones Act could be upheld, no statute could ever be found to
be outside of Congress's commerce  power.121  Whatever the merits of
Lope; the axiom that Congress has limited and enumerated powers is
well-entrenched  in the Constitution's history and structure1 22 (though
of course  the question whether  or how  courts should  enforce  those
limits  today is highly contestable).  By contrast, the notion that state
dignity demands some form of sovereign immunity from federal regu-
lation  falling  within  those  enumerated  powers  is  anything  but
axiomatic.
The  Court's paean  to state  dignity  is  accompanied  by a similar
invocation  of state sovereignty:  "When a State asserts  its immunity to
suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the implemen-
tation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sover-
eignty of the States."123  But as Jack Rakove  has written, even  under
the Articles of Confederation  (much less under the Constitution),  the
States were not "nation-states in the conventional sense, fully empow-
ered  to  confront  the  nations  of  Europe  as  equal  sovereigns."' ' 24
Rakove  elaborates,
From the start  (that is, from the era of the American  Revolution),
our practice  and theory alike have made a hash of the traditional
concept of sovereignty that the colonists inherited from European
theorists. That traditional concept emphasized sovereignty's unitary
and  absolute  nature;  ours  parcels  sovereignty  out  into  bits  and
pieces that are scattered throughout our system of governance, yet
121  See Lopez,  514 U.S. at 564-65.
122  See, e.g., JAcK N. RAIovz,  ORIGNAL MEAniwcs 57-93,  181-201  (1996).
123  Alden, 119 S.  Ct. at 2255-56.
124  Rakove,  supra  note  97, at 1043.
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somehow mystically reunited in the ineffable concept of an all-sover-
eign American  people.
125
In fairness, Justice  Kennedy  could be viewed  as  conceding  that
states are not fully sovereign.  It  is doubtful, however, that the idea of
sovereignty  is  useful  in  describing  our  constitutional  federalism.126
Consider how bizarre it would be to suggest that the sovereign nation
of France  (1)  may  require  the government  of Great Britain  to con-
form to French fair labor standards  and bring suit (or authorize  pri-
vate injunctive actions against British officials)  to enforce such laws, or
(2)  may  preempt  Parliament's  legislative  authority  over  labor
standards.
In  deploying  conceptions  of sovereignty,  the critical  vote in  re-
cent cases, and the greatest enigma, is Justice Kennedy.  Of those  in
the majority in  Alden, only he  also joined  the majority in  U.S.  Term
Limits, Inc. v.  Thornton, 1 27 and thus, was in the majority in every major
federalism  decision  in  recent  years.'28  Kathleen  Sullivan  has  sug-
gested  that he  alone  sees  both  sides  of constitutional federalism-
preventing state interference  with federal sovereignty  while prevent-
ing  federal  authority  from  intruding  on  matters  reserved  to  the
states.'
2 9  But that duality may result less from  a coherent view of fed-
eralism  than  from  an  oscillation  among  inconsistent visions  in  suc-
ceeding  cases.  Thus,  his  conception  of the  relation  of nation  and
states  in Alden seems quite  different  from his position several  terms
ago in  U.S.  Term Limits.  His  concurrence  there, while  perhaps best
known  for its vivid  metaphor  that "[t]he  Framers  split the atom  of
sovereignty,"'30  explicitly endorsed the transformative  nationalism of
Chief Justice Marshall  in McCulloch v. Maryland:
13'
125  Jack N.  Rakove,  Making a Hash of Sovereignty, 2  GREEN  BAG  35,  35  (1998).
126  See Rapaczynski,  supra note 82, at 346-59.
127  514  U.S.  779  (1995).
128  The  same  five Justices joined  the majorities  in  Lopez,  Seminole Tribe,  Alden,
Printz, and  Gregory. Justice Souter added a sixth vote to the  Gregory majority.
129  See Sullivan,  supra note  117, at 103.
130  514 U.S.  at 838  (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131  See id. at 840-41  (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,  17 U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  316, 403
(1819)).
I refer to transformative  nationalism as the view that while the Articles of Confed-
eration were a traditional federation that preserved state sovereignty, the Constitution
represented  a novel re-ordering of affairs, in which the sovereign  people designed a
new national  government  that was  supreme  over  the states but whose  powers  were
limited in important respects.  That view can be seen as standing between two others.
A more  purely nationalist view  would stress  that the separate  colonies acted  collec-
tively through  the Declaration  of Independence  and the  Continental Congress  and
suggest that neither before  nor after Independence were the states fully sovereign in
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The Convention which framed  the constitution was indeed elected
by the state legislatures.  But the instrument.  . . wa  submitted  to
the people....  It is true, they assembled  in-  their several States-
and where else should they have assembled?  No'political  dreamer
was  ever wild  enough  to think  of breaking  down  the lines which
separate  the States, and of compounding the American people into
one  common  mass.  Of  consequence,  when  they  act,  they act in
their States.  But the measures they adopt do not, on that account,
cease to be the measures of the people  themselves  ....  132
Rejecting  the view  in Justice  Thomas's  U.S.  Term Limits dissent that
popular consent was given by the people of each state separately, not
as an undifferentiated national populace,'5 5Justice Kennedy's concur-
the classic sense-most notably in their lack of traditional authority over foreign af-
fairs.  See, e.g.,  SAMUEL  H. BEER, To  MAKE A  NATION:  THE REDISCOVERY  OF AMERIcAN
FEDERAUSM  192-94,  235-36  (1993).  A more  state-oriented  conception would  con-
tend  that the  states  not  only became  sovereign  entities  during  Independence  and
remained  so during  the  Confederation  period,  but  also  that  they  preserved  their
political sovereignty even when  the Constitution was ratified,  except insofar  as they
delegated limited powers to  the national  govemment.  See, e.g.,  U.S. Term Limits, 514
U.S. at 845-49  (Thomas, J., dissenting).
History rarely falls into  neat models.  As Jack Rakove suggests,
The deeper political reality underlying American  constitutionalism was that
sovereignty  was  effectively  divided-parceled  out-from  the  origin  of the
Republic(s).  It did not leap the Atlantic in one fell swoop, to be partitioned
among thirteen sovereign  states, or to  be vested intact in the national  gov-
ernment  of the  Continental  Congress.  Rather,  Congress  and  the  states
emerged simultaneously  as effective  institutions of government,  each exer-
cising powers that  could be  described  as  traditional  marks of sovereignty,
each collaborating in supporting the other's  authority, and each compelled
to place the imperatives of revolution  above any  concern about preserving
sovereignty  in its virginal, unitary purity...
As  the American  colonies metamorphosed  into  states,  they alone  pos-
sessed the sovereign power to enact statutes, collect taxes, and maintain  the
judicial systems  that best defined  the  rights and duties of citizens.  Yet in
matters of war and diplomacy-the  traditional badges  of sovereignty in its
international usage-the Continental Congress enjoyed an undisputed mo-
nopoly from  its own  inception  in 1774.  Significantly,  too, when  the  time
came to replace the defunct colonial regimes and the extralegal apparatus of
revolutionary conventions  with new legal governments, local  authorities al-
ways solicited the approval of Congress before proceeding  to draft the writ-
ten charters that set American constitutionalism on its distinctive course. Yet
when Congress in turn began drafting articles of confederation to define its
own authority, its members recognized that whatever document they drafted
would require  approval by the states.
Rakove,  supra note 125, at 39 (emphasis  in original).
132  McCulloch  v. Maryland,  17 U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  316, 403  (1819).
133  See  U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846-47  (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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rence affirmed, consistently with the  U.S. Term Limits majority, that "it
is well settled that the whole people of the United States asserted their
political identity and unity of purpose when they created the federal
system" and that "the National Government  ...  owes its existence  to
the act of the whole people who created  it."a 1 4
Alden, by contrast, makes no reference  to the sovereignty of the
people  as a whole.  Rather, Justice Kennedy begins with  the dubious
assertion  that  states  enjoyed  sovereignty  before  the ratification,  and
that except as altered by the Constitution, they retain their "residuary
and inviolable  sovereignty." 35  His  concern  in  U.S.  Term Limits that
the national government, though limited in its objects,  "is, and must
be,  controlled  by  the people  without  collateral  interference  by  the
States"'3 6 seems to fall by the wayside  in Alden, where  he treats states
and the United States as being on a par:
It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own im-
munity  from  suit not  only in  state  tribunals  but  also  in  its  own
courts.  In light of our constitutional system recognizing the essen-
tial sovereignty of the States, we are reluctant to conclude  that the
States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.' 3 7
This notion of constitutional reciprocity is an odd one indeed.'38
Contrast with it the following language from the Supreme  Court:
The suggestion  that the act of Congress  is not in harmony with the
policy of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state are free
to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes
what in legal contemplation  does not exist. When Congress, in the
exertion  of the power  confided to it by the Constitution,  adopted
that act, it spoke for all the people and  all the  states, and thereby
134  Id. at 838-39.  Even  commentators  not unsympathetic  to  limits on  national
authority  have  been  skeptical  of Justice  Thomas's  constitutional  account.  See,  e.g.,
Charles Fried,  Foreword:  Revolutions,  109  HARv.  L. REV.  13, 14-15  (1995).
135  Alden, 119 S.  Ct. at 2247.
136  U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841  (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137  Alden, 119  S. Ct. at 2264.  In  P intz, too, the Court put forward this notion  of
parity.  See Printz, 521  U.S. at 928.
138  States,  after  all,  lack broad authority  to  regulate  the  federal government  or
sometimes even its officials,  see, e.g., Barrv. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959),  or to preempt
national  legislative authority.
In considering the aptness of a notion of reciprocity with regard more specifically
to state and federal judiciaries,  contrast the following well-established  doctrines:  (a)
Congress  may limit the exercise  of state court jurisdiction  over federal  causes of ac-
tion by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts,  see generally  HART & WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS,  supra  note 66, at 444-45, but (b) the states may not limit
the exercise of federal jurisdiction  (e.g., jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship)
over state causes of action,  see Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80  U.S.  270 (1871).
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established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Con-
necticut  as if the act had emanated from  its  own legislature,  and
should be respected  accordingly in the courts of the state.'39
Those words were written by that well-known radical nationalist,
Justice Van Devanter.
Finally, invocations of state dignity and sovereignty are far harder
to  maintain  today  than  in  1789.140  In  this  regard,  consider  the
changes in the Supreme Court's view of the question whether a Gover-
nor may be  obliged by federal law  to  extradite  fugitives  to  another
state.  In  its  1860 decision in  Kentucky v. Dennison, 141 the Court inter-
preted the federal extradition statute to create only a moral duty, rul-
ing that
the Federal Government, under the Constitution,  has no power to
impose on a State officer,  as such,  any duty whatever, and compel
him  to perform it; for if it possessed  this power, it might overload
the officer with duties which would  fill up all his time, and disable
him from performing his obligations  to the State,  and might impose
on him  duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to
which he was  elevated by the State.' 42
That decision was unanimously overruled in  1987 in  Puerto  Rico v.
Branstad,1 43 where the Court found it to rest "upon a foundation with
which time and the currents of constitutional change have dealt much
less  favorably,"  and on a fundamental premise-"that  the States  and
the Federal Government  in  all circumstances must be viewed  as coe-
qual  sovereigns"-that  is  "fundamentally  incompatible  with  more
than a  century of constitutional development."' 44
Of course, Dennison's broad language may have been inspired by
the politics of slavery  (extradition  had been  sought  of a free  black
charged with assisting the escape of a slave), and the decision came on
the eve of the Civil War, when, according to the Branstad  Court, "the
practical  power  of the Federal  Government  [was]  at its  lowest  ebb
139  Mondou v. NewYork, N.H. & H. R.R.,  223 U.S. 1,  57 (1912).  To be sure, other
language in Mondou indicates that the case did not involve any attempt by Congress to
enlarge  state  court jurisdiction,  but rather  that federal  law presupposed  that state
courts already possessed such jurisdiction.  See id. at 56.
140  Indeed, it is interesting how far the Alden majority succeeded-not completely,
but considerably-in  inducing Justice  Souter  to  debate  the  case  on  originalist
premises.
141  65 U.S.  66  (1860).
142  Id at 107-08  (emphasis  added).
143  483 U.S.  219  (1987).
144  Id. at 227, 228, 230.  Notably, Justices O'Connor and Powell dissociated them-
selves from these broad statements.  See id. at 231.
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since  the adoption of the Constitution."'145  Yet although  slavery and
the  Civil War  are surely unique, the history of state sovereign immu-
nity has also been influenced by the ebbs and flows of national power,
including  the  extent of  federal courts'  "practical power"  to enforce
judgments against the states.146  Today one hardly doubts that judicial
power  (whether  state  or  federal)  is  adequate  to  require  Maine,  if
found liable, to pay a judgment under the FLSA.  (There is little rea-
son to  think that the  practical  capacity  of federal  courts  to  enforce
private judgments against the states when enforcing  statutes  enacted
under Article I is any less than their capacity to do so when enforcing
statutes enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-en-
forcement that sovereign immunity  law still permits.)
More  broadly, just as  understandings  of the  federal  commerce
power necessarily have expanded in the face of national economic in-
tegration and expanded  federal regulation, so notions of state sover-
eignty cannot remain  static  given  the dramatic  growth  in both state
governmental  activity  and in its  intersection  with  that  same  federal
regulation.  Multiple  Congresses, in their exercise of Article I powers,
have indicated-with the clear statement that the Supreme Court now
demands-that proper regulation under a range  of federal statutory
regimes  calls for state damage  liability.' 47  Those congressional  deci-
145  Id. at 225.
146  See generally  JOHN  V. ORTH,  THE JUDICIAL  POWER  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES:  THE
ELEVENTH  AMENDMENT  IN  AMERICAN  HISTORY  (1987);  John J.  Gibbons,  The Eleventh
Amendment and State  Sovereign Immunity:  A  Reinterpretation, 83  COLUM.  L.  REv.  1889
(1983).
147  The majority opinion  in Alden states that the first example of such legislation
was the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) in 1908.  SeeAlden, 119  S. Ct. at 2261.
In recent decades, as federal legislation has reached more widely and state activity has
expanded so as to intersect with federal regulatory concerns, statutes subjecting states
to suit have increased  in  number.  They include  (in  addition  to the FELA and  the
FLSA) the laws protecting copyrights,  see 17 U.S.C. §§  501 (a), 511  (1994)  (enacted by
Pub. L. No.  101-553,  § 2(a)(1),  104 Stat. 2749, 2749-50  (1990)),  trademarks,  see 15
U.S.C. §  1122 (1994)  (enacted by Pub. L. No. 102-542,  § 3(b), 106 Stat. 3567, 3567-68
(1992)),  and  patents,  see 35  U.S.C.  § 296  (1994)  (enacted by  Pub. L. No.  102-560,
§ 2(a) (2), 106 Stat. 4230, 4230-31  (1992)); the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (Supp. III 1997)  (enacted by Pub. L. No. 105-17, tit. I, §  101, 111
Stat. 37, 47  (1997));  the bankruptcy  laws,  see 11  U.S.C. § 106  (1996)  (enacted by the
Bankruptcy  Reform  Act of  1994,  Pub. L.  No.  103-394,  §  113,  108  Stat. 4106,  4117
(1994));  the Veterans'  Reemployment  Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4) (a) (iii)  (1994)
(enacted by Pub. L. No. 103-353,  §2(a),  108  Stat. 3149,  3150 (1994));  the Family and
Medical  Leave  Act of 1993,  29 U.S.C.  § 2617(a) (2)  (1994)  (enacted  by Pub. L. No.
10-3, tit. I, §  104, 107 Stat.  6, 15  (1993));  laws preventing discrimination  on various
bases by recipients of federal funds, see The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-506, tit. X, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845  (1986)  (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(1994));  laws providing for equal opportunity for individuals  with disabilities,  see 42
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sions have been made against a broader legal trend of restricting state
and federal  immunity from  suit1 48-treating  sovereign  immunity, in
the words of'Justice Frankfurter, as "an anachronistic  survival of mo-
narchical  privilege" that "runs counter to democratic  notions of the
moral responsibility of the State."' 49  In the face of all this, one has to
question the decision of sometime-textualists  to impose a non-textual
limitation on federal legislative power that is based on a highly con-
testable vision of the original understanding' 50  and that has all of the
infirmities previously noted.  So much for judicial restraint.
V.  WHY Awmv?
How, then, can one understand  the Court's current direction in
its federalism decisions?  Despite the difficulties of seeking to explain
judicial behavior-whether  of individual Justices or, in this case, of a
consistent majority of five-I will hazard a few suggestions.
One  hypothesis  would focus  on  the  Court's  perception  of the
need to protect its own role in the constitutional scheme of separation
of powers-a hypothesis that links Alden to  City  of Boerne.  In  City of
Boerne, the Court viewed  enactment of RFRA as an effort by Congress,
prompted  by disagreement  with  the Court's  rulings,  to  change the
contours of a constitutional right.151  The Court might similarly view
efforts by Congress to authorize private suit in state court as reflecting
a lack of respect for the Court's commitment to the Eleventh Amend-
ment as  a protection  of state  immunity from  federal  court suit.  In
Seminole  Tribe, the  Court  plainly  expressed  its view  that a  contrary
holding there, so as to permit Congress routinely to overcome immu-
nity from federal court suit via statutory abrogation, would have made
immunity  of little  consequence. 152  Having  thus  fortified  immunity
from federal court suit by making it invulnerable to abrogation by stat-
U.S.C. §  12202 (1994)  (enacted by Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. V, § 502, 104 Stat. 327, 340
(1990));  and the age  discrimination  in employment  laws,  see The  Fair Labor  Stan-
dards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259,  § 28(a) (2),  88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)  (1994)).
148  See generally GEORGE  C. CHRISu  ET AL.,  CASES AND  MATERIALS  ON  THlE LAW  OF
TORTS 1330-31  (3d ed. 1997); HART  &  WECHSLER'S  THE FEDERAL  COURTS,  supra  note
66, at 1027-39; James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity:
Federal  Appellate Court Reveiew of  State CourtJudgments  After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L.
REV.  161,  205-07  & nn.166-69  (1998).
149  Kennecott  Copper  Corp.  v.  State  Tax  Comm'n,  327  U.S.  573,  580  (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
150  See generally Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269-87  (Souter,  J., dissenting).
151  See City of Boerne v. Flores,  521 U.S.  507, 535-36  (1997).
152  See Seminole  Tribe, 517  U.S. at 64  ("If Hans means only that federal-question
suits for money damages against the States cannot be brought in federal court unless
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utes enacted under Article I, the Court may not have wanted Congress
to be able to make an  end run around immunity by authorizing pri-
vate suit in state court; hence  Alden.'5s  Insofar as Congress was  seen
as  promoting private  suit against states,  whether  in federal  or state
court, one might say here, as  Michael McConnell  said of the  City of
Boerne decision, that the  majority "viewed congressional  action  as an
irrelevance, if not an impertinence."' 1 54
Turning from institutional role  to substantive commitment, one
can  view  Alden as  part  of a reaction  by the Justices  in the majority
against what they view as excessive and unjustified federal intervention
into  matters  that should be  left to the states-a reaction  not exclu-
sively against regulation  of "states qua states," but more broadly against
improvident  uses  of federal regulatory  power that,  even after  Lopez,
remain within constitutional bounds.155  The Court may well lament,
as I often do, that our current political climate  assigns so little weight
to the tradition-proclaimed by Herbert Wechsler in 1954 as the most
important political safeguard of federalism-that federal intervention
is "exceptional" and must be justified by "some necessity." 1 56  Indeed,
various of the  decisions limiting national  power have been character-
ized, by me and others, as a warning shot, or a form of cuing, to Con-
gress, meant to admonish  it not to go "too far."157
Congress  clearly says so, it means nothing at all."  (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.,  491  U.S.  1, 36  (1989)  (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
153  Of course,  the  Alden ruling created  considerable  tension with  statements  in
earlier opinions that the  llth Amendment does not apply in state court-statements
whose fair implication was that the point disposed of any sovereign  immunity issue.
See, e.g.,  Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S.  197, 205 (1991);  Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7  (1980);  cf Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21  (1979)
("[A] I1  of these cases  [concerning the scope of state sovereign immunity]  concerned
questions of federa-courtjurisdiction  ....  These  decisions do not answer the ques-
tion whether the Constitution places any limit on the exercise  of one's State's power
to authorize  its  courts to  assert jurisdiction  over another  State.").  For  some of the
difficulties found  in  Alden's treatment  of precedent,  see  HART & WEcHsLER's  1999
SUPPLEMENT,  supra note *,  at 135-36.
154  Michael  W.  McConnell,  Institutions and Interpretation: A  Critique of City  of
Boerne v. Flores,  111 HAv.  L. REv.  153,  174  (1997).
155  For a similar suggestion, see  Caminker, supra note  1, at 1001,  1007.
156  Herbert Wechsler,  The Political  Safeguards of  Federalism:  The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National  Government,  54 CoLUM.  L. REV.  543, 544 (1954).
157  See PILIP BoBBrrr, CONsTrr  ONAL  FATE  190-95  (1982);Jenna Bednar &  Wil-
liam N.  Eskridge, Jr.,  Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A  Theory ofjudicial  Enforce-
ment of Federalism, 68 S.  CAL.  L. REV.  1447-50  (1995);Jackson,  supra note 1, at 2227;
Meltzer,  supra  note 9, at 63; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids  of Sacrifice?  Problems of  Federal-
ism in Mandating  State Implementation of  National  Environmental  Policy, 86 YALE  L.J. 1196,
1270 (1976);  Mark Tushnet,  Why the Supreme Court Overruled  National League of Cities,
47 VAND.  L. REv.  1623,  1652  (1994).
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But perhaps the Court thinks that Congress, to use a contempo-
rary idiom, just doesn't get it, and hence some additional medicine  is
needed to counteract congressional excesses.  The medicine adminis-
tered prior to Alden could be viewed as relatively mild.  Lopez, as many
have noted, 1 58  invalidated a pointless federal crime  enacted for sym-
bolic or political reasons, and set forth constitutional limits that Con-
gress  can usually satisfy with little loss of regulatory effectiveness-as
Congress illustrated when it rehabilitated  the very statute invalidated
by Lopez by adding ajurisdictional element that will virtually always be
present.159  New  York  v.  United  States and  Printz raised  fascinating
problems of constitutional theory, but the absence of a square prece-
dent in either case suggests that the impact of those decisions may be
quite limited;160 indeed, the Court rejected an  expansive reading  of
Printz this Term  in  Reno v.  Condon.161  Perhaps,  then,  the Court  in
Alden wanted  to  send  a stronger  message.  To be  sure,  Alden,  like
Printz or New  York  v.  United States, did not hold a particular subject
matter (regulation under the commerce power of  fair labor standards,
158  SeeJesse H. Choper, Did the Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States' Rights Move-
ment Within the Supreme Court"?,  46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 663-64 (1996); DeborahJones
Merritt,  Commerce!, 94 MIcH. L.  REV.  674,  692  (1995); Robert F. Nagel,  The Future of
Federalism, 46  CASE  W. RES.  L.  REv.  643,  648  (1996);  Louis H.  Pollak,  Foreword, 94
McH. L. REV.  533, 551-52  (1995); H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlim-
ited Ends, 94 MIcH. L. REv.  651,  652  (1995).
159  The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994),  as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-
208, tit. I, §  101(f)  (1996),  forbids possession in a school zone of a firearm  "that has
moved in or that otherwise  affects interstate or foreign commerce."  Most commenta-
tors have assumed that the amended  statute falls comfortably within the Commerce
Clause even after Lopez,  see, e.g., Steven D. Clymer,  UnequalJustice:  The Federalization  of
Criminal  Law, 70 S.  CAL.  L. REv. 643, 662-64 (1997);  Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver  After
Seminole  Tribe, 82  MINN.  L.  REV.  793, 822  n.119  (1998);  Harry Litman  & Mark D.
Greenberg, Federal  Power and Federalism:  A  Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of
Traditionally  State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.  921, 930-31  (1997), and the statute's
constitutionality was upheld in a routine opinion  in  United States v. Danks, 187 F.3d
643  (8th Cir. 1999)  (unpublished table  decision).
160  See, e.g., Caminker, supra  note 14, at 199-200;Jesse H. Choper, On the Difference
in Importance Between  Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual Consequences: A  Review  of the
Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19  CARIozo L. REV.  2259, 2269  (1998).
161  120 S. Ct. 666  (2000).  There, the Court unanimously reversed the Fourth Cir-
cuit, which had declared the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act unconstitutional
under both Printz and New  York.  In so ruling, the  Supreme  Court stressed that the
Act, while it regulates the  states, does  not require  a state  to  either enact any laws
regulating private individuals or to assist in enforcing federal statutes regulating pri-
vate individuals.  See id. at 672.  The Court did say that it did not need to address (and
thus could be viewed as having left open) the question whether a law lacking either of
these defects might nonetheless be void because it regulates the states exclusively;  the
Act regulates  private entities  as well.  See id. at 669-70.
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registration  of handguns,  or nuclear  waste)  to  be  outside  congres-
sional  authority.  But the  enforcement  technique  that  Alden  invali-
dated, private suit against the states, is of far more general importance
to  a  broad range  of federal  programs  than  is  "commandeering"  of
state political officials.  Indeed, while protesting in Alden that its deci-
sion really  did not curtail federal enforcement  power in  any signifi-
cant respect,162  perhaps  the  Court was not perturbed if, in fact, the
decision drew  a little blood.
A distinct though consistent hypothesis is  that some if not all  of
the Justices in the majority lack sympathy for Garcia  and do not trust
the political safeguards of federalism adequately to protect their vision
of state autonomy from direct federal regulation.  Justices Rehnquist
and  O'Connor, the  only  Garcia dissenters  still  on  the  Court, both
pointedly predicted  in  their  Garcia dissents  that the majority's  posi-
tion there would in time be overruled.163  But even if five of today's
Justices would not, as a matter of first impression, have joined the  Gar-
cia opinion,  they might hesitate  to overrule  it in a case like  Alden.'64
For to  have  done so would have meant that in each  of the last four
decades  of this century, the Court would have shifted its position on
whether Congress may subject state and local governments  to fair la-
bor standards.  Imagine  this citation:  Maryland v.  Wirtz, 392  U.S.  183
(1968),  overruled by  National League of Cities v.  Usery,  426  U.S.  833
(1976),  overruled by Garcia  v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit  Authority,
469  U.S.  528  (1985),  overruled by  Alden  v.  Maine, 119  S.  Ct.  2240
(1999).165
A variation on this theme would begin with the same uncertainty
about whether  five Justices  remain sympathetic  to  Garcia, but would
focus on problems of constitutional implementation. 66  If the  Garcia
majority is  taken at face  value, the Court there rejected the state au-
tonomy approach  of National League of Cities v.  Usery' 67 in large part
because of the judiciary's inability to develop a doctrine whose appli-
cation was relatively predictable and did not appear  to be unduly re-
162  Alden, 119  S.  Ct. at 2266-68.
163  See  Garcia  v.  San  Antonio  Metro  Transit Auth.,  469  U.S.  528,  580  (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting);  id. at 589  (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164  See supra note 28.
165  On the  other hand, perhaps  Alden could  contribute  to the  Court's arguing,
some years from  now, that  Garcia  has been sufficiently undercut by subsequent deci-
sions that it can no longer be viewed as good law.  Cf Yoo, supra note 28, at 1334-35
(declaring, before Alden, that  Garcia  is not and should not be viewed  as good law).
166  See generally Richard  H. Fallon, Jr.,  Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV.  L. Ruv. 54  (1997).
167  426 U.S.  833  (1976).
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suit-oriented.168  Although  that objection  did  not  convince Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, it may resonate with other members of the
Alden majority insofar as they, though surely sympathetic to protection
of state autonomy, also believe in  the importance of determinate doc-
trine.  (Justice Scalia is the most obvious example.169)  But a decision
like Alden permits pursuit of the impulse  to protect state  autonomy
without the difficulties of National  League of Cities, for the Court could
borrow the readily available  Eleventh Amendment  doctrine  limiting
federal court power, and by applying it  also in  state courts, expand it
into a general immunity from private suit. Eleventh Amendment doc-
trine, to be sure, is replete with quirks, and, like most doctrines,  has
considerable  uncertainty at its margins,170  but it is relatively determi-
native  and has been richly elaborated  in  prior cases."71  Moreover, a
doctrine  of state sovereign immunity from private suit can be viewed
as  premised  on  less  controversial  limitations  concerning  legislative
technique rather than on judicial evaluation of the importance of leg-
islative ends.
It  is worth pausing to explore in  more detail the implications  of
this last hypothesis.  Ordinarily, questions of substantive constitutional
law are thought of as of primary importance, while questions ofjuris-
dictional and remedial authority to enforce substantive constitutional
doctrines are secondary to, and indeed are shaped by, the substantive
constitutional doctrines.  Thus, the central questions of constitutional
law would be the scope of national legislative  authority  (the issue in
Lopez)  or  the scope  of a  state's  substantive  immunity from  national
168  See Garcia,  469 U.S. at 533-39, 546-47.  Mark Tushnet notes from his examina-
tion of the Court's internal records  in the Brennan and Marshall papers thatJustice
Blackmun  initially voted to invalidate the application  of the FLSA to the governmen-
tal activity involved  in  Garcia, but after being assigned  the opinion, he  prepared  a
draft reaching  the opposite result-presumably because the opinion he expected to
draft would not write.  See Tushnet, supra note  157, at 1627-28.
169  See generally  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting  the Constitution and Laws,  in A MATrER  OF
INTERP=rATION:  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE  LAW  (Amy Gutmann  ed.,  1997); Antonin
Scalia,  The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.  L. REv.  1175,  1185  (1989).
Of course, Justices  Scalia and Kennedy did join  Gregory v. Asheroft,  501  U.S.  452
(1991),  which endorses a doctrinal  test, as a matter of statutory interpretation,  that
may also  be difficult  to apply predictably.  See supra text accompanying notes  15-17.
170  See, e.g.,  Currie, supra note  15, at 149; VWzquez,  supra note  15, at 2-3.
171  Moreover, though  I doubt that the historical materials go very far in support-
ing the Court's ultimate conclusion, without a doubt there were elements in the his-
torical record-both from the Founding era and from the evolution  of remedies in
the nineteenth  and early  twentieth  centuries-that resonate with  the view that state
governments are immune from retrospective liability.  See generally  Woolhandler, supra
note 76.
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regulation  (the issue in  National League of Cities and  Garcia). That is
why I have described  Lopez  as a "narrow decision about a question of
great moment-the  scope of congressional  power  to regulate," while
Alden, like  Seminole Tribe, is "a broader  decision about a question of
less significance.'
72
Thus, at least for as long as  Lopez is quite a marginal limitation,
and  Garcia's overruling of National League of Cities remains good law,
the  Court's  current regulation  of constitutional federalism  seems  to
be leading with the tail rather than the dog: the Constitution does not
limit Congress's power to impose duties on the states under the FLSA,
but it does limit Congress's authority to provide the full range of rem-
edies for those duties.  Lacking a robust theory of what limits (or what
judicially enforceable  limits)  the Constitution places on congressional
regulatory  authority, the  Court  directs  its  primary effort  to  limiting
the scope  of remedies that Congress may deploy.
This  approach  to  enforcing  some  conception  of constitutional
federalism seems at once ineffectual and counterproductive.  It is inef-
fectual because it leaves the states subject to FLSA regulation; indeed,
if states  were  to comply  fully and in good faith  with  federal  duties,
then  the immunity recognized  by  Seminole Tribe and  Alden would be
beside the point, for private  suits seeking  damages would never have
to be filed.  The inadequacy  of Alden to promote any robust concep-
tion of state sovereignty  underlies Charles Fried's vivid description of
Alden as "like using a screwdriver  to pound nails."173
However, in order to  evoke more  clearly the damage that  Alden
may  cause  to  the enforcement  of legitimate  and important federal
objectives,  one could equally well  invert Fried's image,  and describe
the decision  as "like using a hammer to drive screws."  For Alden is a
rule of enormous generality, applicable  apparently to  all exercises  of
national legislative authority under Article I, not merely to those that
seem  marginal or  overreaching.  Federal  regulation  under relatively
more specific  grants of regulatory power-to  enact uniform  rules re-
garding bankruptcy, or to create exclusive rights in "Writings and Dis-
coveries"-are  now limited by state immunity, as is legislation that no
one would think near the outer reaches of the commerce power (e.g.,
the  regulation  of state-owned  railroads  operating  in interstate  com-
merce).  Because,  as  noted  earlier, retrospective  liability  may be an
important regulatory tool, the Court's recognition of a general immu-
172  Meltzer,  supra note 9, at 63.
173  Charles Fried,  Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,  1999, at A17.
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nity from private suit in both federal and state court may have signifi-
cant consequences for regulatory effectiveness. 174
That Alden is at once ineffectual in protecting state interests and
harmful to achievement of legitimate national objectives may explain
differing reactions  to it.  Focusing  on  the  first point, some  have  ar-
gued that Alden is a decision of only marginal significance.  Thus, for
example,  Kathleen  Sullivan wrote shortly after this  Term's immunity
decisions  that criticism  of them was "hyperbolic" and stated that "the
striking feature of these rulings is how little they challenged  the fed-
eral government's substantive power to make labor, patent and trade-
mark  law.' 75  She  stated,  quite  accurately,  that  "[t]hese  decisions
were not about whether Congress may regulate the states in these ar-
eas but rather how it may enforce  such regulation," but with a clear
implication  that the latter  question  is of greatly subordinate  impor-
tance.176  But those who, like me, are more inclined to think that Al-
den  has  greater  significance,  focus  less  on  its  leaving  substantive
regulatory ruling intact and more on its potential  to impair effective
enforcement of the substantive power that the federal government re-
tains.177  To be sure, given the lack of a longstanding history of federal
174  See supra Part I.
175  Kathleen M.  Sullivan,  Federal  Power, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES,  June  27,  1999,  § 4,
at 17.
176  Id.; see also  Rapaczynski,  supra  note 82, at 346 n.21 (dismissing sovereign immu-
nity as largely irrelevant  to federalism  because  states  are not immune  from suit by
other states or the United States-with little attention to the effectiveness of such suits
in enforcing legal regimes).
Mark Tushnet echoes this perspective  and offers the related argument that "less-
than-maximally effective remedies are not strangers even to constitutional law," point-
ing to cases  limiting the reach  of Bivens remedies  or extending qualified  immunity
from damages in constitutional tort actions against officials.  Tushnet, supra note 52,
at  73  n.212.  The  point  is  surely  correct,  but  overlooks  the  difference  between
remedies ordered by courts on their own (or when enforcing broadly worded enact-
ments like 42  U.S.C. § 1983  (1994))  and remedies whose provision  is specifically di-
rected  by federal  legislation;  constitutional  foreclosure  of the  latter is  a far more
serious matter.
177  A sociologist of the legal academy might wonder whether differing perspectives
on the significance  of a decision  like Alden may be partially explained by the conven-
tional division  of constitutional  law  topics  in law school  curricula.  In  general,  the
bulk of federalism-related  matters-for example,  the reach of the commerce power
(as well  as its  dormant preemptive  effect);  the  existence  vel non of constitutionally
protected areas of state autonomy from federal regulation; and the scope of legislative
power under the Reconstruction  amendments-are  discussed  in the basic constitu-
tional law course.  Other topics that bear importantly on the enforcement of constitu-
tional rights-sovereign immunity, constitutional remedies,  congressional control of
federal court  jurisdiction, and remedial authority-are typically considered in federal
courts or civil rights courses.  Dean Sullivan is a teacher of constitutional law but not
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imposition  of retrospective  liability  on  state  governments,  there  is
something to the claim that the constitutional preclusion  of such lia-
bility cannot  be treated  as  a serious  truncation  of necessary federal
authority.178  Yet "experience  for much of that time, when both fed-
eral regulatory power and state governmental  activity were  far more
constricted, may not be highly pertinent to today's problems";179 the
intersection of the application  of federal patent laws to the states and
recent growth in the development of patentable products by state uni-
versities  is just one  example of that phenomenon.  Surely Congress,
which one would ordinarily take to be better equipped than the Court
to determine what means  of enforcement  are important, has  repeat-
edly taken a view in recent years that retrospective state liability should
be an available  remedy under a variety of federal statutes. 80
The tail-wagging-the-dog  quality of the Court's  interventions  re-
garding  constitutional  federalism  makes  me  think  that the  current
doctrinal pattern is not a stable one.  The Court may decide to extend
Lopez or resurrect National  League of Cities or otherwise recognize sub-
stantive  limits on Congress's regulatory authority.  Or perhaps,  to of-
fer a more hopeful vista, a future Court will take the view that Seminole
Tribe and  Alden were misguided and will  overrule their limitation  of
congressional power.
VI.  ABROGATION  UNDER SEGrION  5: THE  _FORIDvA  PizEPADZ)  DECISION
The  Court's  companion  decision  in  Florida Prepaid  Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v.  College Savings Bank' 8'  exhibits  a similarly
of federal  courts.  By contrast,  as a federal  courts  teacher  who does  not teach  the
standard constitutional law course, perhaps I am predisposed  "to doubt that 'the cen-
tral problems for constitutional law..,  are  issues of the definition  of rights rather
than  the creation  of a machinery  of jurisdiction  and  remedies  that can  transform
rights proclaimed on paper  into practical protections.'"  Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private
Attorneys General, 88 COLUM.  L. REV.  247,  282 (1988)  (quoting Benno  C. Schmidt, Jr.,
Juries,  Jurisdiction,  and Race Discrimination:  The Lost Promise ofStrauder v. West Virginia,
61 TEx. L. REV.  1401,  1413  (1983)).  Attention to the available machinery in statutory
cases like Alden, it should go without saying, is of equal importance.
As put, the point is plainly too  crude: some constitutional  law teachers  lament
Alden, while some federal courts teachers  think it correct; and quite a few law profes-
sors confound  any simple  distinction by teaching  both subjects.  But nonetheless  it
seems possible that the differing perspectives  of the different courses may account for
some of the variation  in reactions  to Alden.
178  See Meltzer,  supra note 9,  at 47.
179  See id. (discussing  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71-72).
180  See supra note 147.
181  119 S.  Ct. 2199  (1999).
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constricted judicial willingness to defer to Congress in matters of con-
stitutional federalism.  The issue there was the validity of the "Patent
and Plant Variety Protection  Remedy  Clarification  Act,"182  through
which  Congress, in 1992, had purported to abrogate  the states'  Elev-
enth Amendment immunity and thus to subject them to private dam-
age  actions in federal court for patent infringement.  The validity of
the abrogation depended on the source of legislative authority behind
it: if authorized  only by the Patent Clause  of Article  I, the effort to
abrogate was doomed under  Seminole Tribe; but if authorized by Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act was, under the Court's
decision  in  Fitzpatrick v.  Bitzer,183  a valid  exercise  of congressional
power.  Given  that somewhat odd doctrinal structure, recognition  of
broad power in Congress  to legislate under Section 5 might seem, at
least to devotees  of state  sovereign  immunity, to permit an  end run
around the Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe. 184
From this perspective, it was no great surprise  that the five Jus-
tices in the Alden majority again joined together in Florida  Prepaid  to
hold that the Patent Remedy Act could not be upheld under Section 5
as a measure to enforce the right of patent holders not to be deprived
of their intellectual  property without due process  of law.  In  Florida
Prepaid,  the  Court purported to apply  the framework  of its decision
two years earlier in  City of Boerne, a case not involving state sovereign
immunity, which had decided far broader questions  about the scope
of congressional authority under Section 5.  This Essay is not the occa-
sion  to  evaluate  the  Court's  approach  in  City  of Boerne.'8 5  What  is
182  Pub. L. No. 102-560,  § 2(a),  106 Stat. 4230, 4230  (1992)  (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(h),  296  (1994)).
183  427 U.S.  445  (1976).
184  Concern  to that effect had been expressed directly by lower courts.  See, e.g.,
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139  F.3d 504, 510-11  (5th Cir. 1998)  (holding that to
permit an action against a state for copyright infringement under Section 5 would be
"a direct  end-run around  Seminole's holding that Article  I powers may not be  em-
ployed to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's limit on the federal judicial power"),  va-
cated and remanded, 180 F.3d 674  (5th Cir. 1999)  (en banc)  (per curiam).
185  For varying  defenses  of this  decision,  see,  for example,  Christopher  L. Eis-
gruber  & Lawrence  G. Sager,  Congressional  Power and Religious Liberty After  City  of
Boerne v. Flores,  1997  Sup. CT.  REv.  79, Vicki  C. Jackson,  Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative  Constitutionalism:  Opening  Up the Conversation  on "Proportionality,"Rights  and
Federalism, 1 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 583 (1999),  and William W. Van Alstyne,  TheFailure  of
the Religious  Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth  Amendment, 46 DUKE
L.J. 291  (1996).
For criticism,  see, for example,  Akhil Reed Amar,  Intratextualism, 112  HAmv. L.
REV.  747, 818-27  (1999),  David Cole,  The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v.
Flores  and Congressional  Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997  Sup. CT.  REV.  31,  and
McConnell,  supra note 154.
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noteworthy about Florida  Prepaid,  however, is that the Court's applica-
tion  of the  City  of Boerne framework  was at once  cavalier  and highly
restrictive, leading  one  to surmise that the  majority's powerful  com-
mitment  to  the proposition  that  states  should not be  suable  at the
behest of private parties may shape  its application of related constitu-
tional  doctrines.
In Florida  Prepaid,  the Court began  by considering  the scope  of
the constitutional right that the Patent Remedy Act could be viewed as
redressing.  The  majority advanced  two  reasons  why a  state that in-
fringes  a private patent may not have  deprived the patent holder  of
property without due process, and, therefore, why the Patent Remedy
Act extended well beyond enforcing the  patent holder's  due process
right.  First, the Court doubted the existence of a deprivation. Writing
for the  Court,  the Chief Justice  contrasted  the  Court's  due process
precedents-which  hold that no  deprivation  results from merely negli-
gent action of state  officials-with  the patent laws,  which authorize
infringement  actions against  (inter alia) the states  even where  the in-
fringement  was  entirely  inadvertent.18 6  But as  the  dissenters  noted
without contradiction,  the patent holder's  complaint alleged a willful
violation  of the  patent  laws,' 87  an  adequate  basis  (at the  pleading
stage) for establishing that, as applied to  the case at hand,1 88  the Pat-
ent Remedy Act was redressing  a  deprivation of property. 8 9
186  See Florida  Prepaid,  119  S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting  5 DONALD  S.  CHISUM,  PATENTS
§  16.02 (2), at 16-31 (rev. ed. 1998)  ("It is, of course, elementary that an infringement
may  be  entirely  inadvertent  and  unintentional  and  without  knowledge  of  the
patent.")).
187  See id. at 2213  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188  On the preference for as-applied adjudication, see, for example, United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987),  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504
(1985),  and  Yazoo  &  Mississippi Valley  Railroad v. Jackson Vinegar Co.,  226  U.S.  217,
219-20  (1912).
189  Moreover,  the precise  meaning of the requirement of intentional conduct in
the patent context is difficult to discern because of the Court's failure to apply it to
the facts of the case.  The requirement originated in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.  327
(1986), where a prisoner claimed that he injured himself after tripping over a pillow
negligently left on a staircase by a prison official.  Quite  different from that situation
was the one alleged in F/orida Prepaid-that  a state agency was engaged in systematic
marketing of a product that infringed the plaintiff's patent.  Surely the conduct of the
responsible state  officials in developing and marketing the  product in  question  was
intentional, as was  any resulting harm to (diversion of business from) the plaintiff. It
would hardly seem necessary, in order to be faithful to Daniels's evident concern with
avoiding the  constitutionalization  of isolated  instances of official negligence,  to  re-
quire a further showing that the responsible state officials knew (a) that the plaintiff
held the patent in question,  (b)  that the patent was valid, or (c)  that the state's use
was an infringing one.
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The Justices comprising the majority in  Florida  Prepaid  have been
those most insistent on judging the constitutionality of statutes on an
as-applied  rather  than  a facial  basis.190  Consequently,  their  failure
even  to  articulate  any argument  for  departing from  their own  pre-
ferred practice of as-applied adjudication  is puzzling.191 But perhaps
190  See City of Chicago v. Morales,  119  S.  Ct. 1849,  1867-70  (1999)  (Scalia, J., dis-
senting);  id. at 1886  (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. & Scalia, J.); Janklow v.
Planned Parenthood,  517 U.S.  1174, 1175-76  (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.  &
Thomas, J., dissenting)  (denying certiorari to Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d
1452  (8th  Cir.  1995));  Ohio v.  Akron  Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497  U.S.  502,  514
(1990)  (Kennedy, J., joined, inter alia, by Rehnquist,  CJ. & O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.)
(stating that "[t]he Court of Appeals should not have invalidated the Ohio statute on
a facial challenge  based upon  a worst-case  analysis  that may never occur");  United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)  (Rehnquist, CJ.,joined,  inter alia,  by O'Connor
& Scalia, JJ.).
191  My colleague  Dick Fallon, while in the end critical of the Court's facial invali-
dation of the Patent Remedy Act, has  suggested a possible explanation therefor.  In
his view, (a) the appropriateness of facial challenges depends upon the nature of the
constitutional infirmity in the statute,  as some infirmities (e.g., unconstitutional pur-
pose)  may infect a statute in its  entirety, and (b) the defect in Florida  Prepaid  might
plausibly be viewed  as a failure  by Congress  adequately  to deliberate  about  and to
articulate  legislative findings  concerning, the  need for the legislation as a means  of
enforcing the Constitution-a failure that infected the entire statute.  See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial  Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv.  L. REv.
(forthcoming Apr. 2000).  Of course, as Fallon recognizes, the observation that some
constitutional defects may infect any conceivable statutory application does not neces-
sarily require facial invalidation-that is, a judicial order enjoining every application
of the statute.  Rather, it ordinarily would suffice for the court to invalidate the statute
as applied to particular litigants, albeit on a theory whose implication is that no other
application of the statute would be constitutional.  In practice the two approaches are
unlikely to vary significantly unless a second court not bound by the prior ruling were
to disagree with it. The key question, then, is whether the applicable test under  City of
Boerne concerns a defect in congressional process.
The recent decision in Kimel v. Florida  Board of Regents, 120  S.  Ct.  631  (2000),
suggests  that the  initial inquiry under  City of Boerne is one  of proportionality, which
considers whether a substantial percentage of cases to which a statute applies involve
conduct that also would violate the  14th Amendment.  See id. at 644-45.  The Court
added, however,  that the fact
[tihat [a statute]  prohibits very little  conduct likely  to be held unconstitu-
tional, while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our Section 5
inquiry.  Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,
and we  have  never held  that Section  5 precludes  Congress from enacting
reasonably prophylactic legislation....  One means by which we have made
such a determination in the past is by examining the legislative record  con-
mining the reasons for Congress'  action.
Id. at 648.  It thus appears that any process concern under  City of Boerne is secondary,
arising only after a finding that an insufficient proportion  of conduct reached by a
statute is also unconstitutional.
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in deciding whether to engage in facial  or in as-applied adjudication,
the key factor is the depth of the Court's commitment to the underly-
ing constitutional value.  Much  as  the Warren  Court permitted  First
Amendment facial attacks  in part because  of its view of the singular
importance  of free expression, the Rehnquist Court may permit facial
challenges to statutes  as outside the enumerated powers  of Congress
in part because of its view of the importance of constitutional federal-
ism, or, more specifically, of state sovereign immunity.1 9 2  If that is so,
it would  only highlight the distance  the Court has  moved from  the
theory of  Garcia: not only  is  federalism  now  to  be  enforced  in the
judicial rather than the political process, but enforcement is to be im-
plemented  through  an  especially  aggressive  adjudicatory  technique.
There remains, however, a question about how this primary standard of propor-
tionality is capable of as applied adjudication.  In individual rights litigation, a litigant
whose  conduct  is  constitutionally  protected  may, without more,  have  a statute  de-
clared invalid as applied to his conduct.  By contrast, a state, when contending that a
measure falls outside of Section 5, does not prevail simply by showing that the particu-
lar conduct at issue is not independently unconstitutional;  the constitutional question
in the particular case depends upon consideration of the general reach of the statute
as compared to the reach of the self-executing Constitution.  Still, merely because the
proportionality test by its nature compares  two classes of conduct does not preclude
as  applied  adjudication.  For  example,  even  were  the  Patent  Remedy  Act  to  be
deemed unconstitutional,  because  disproportionate,  if applied  to all state patent in-
fringement whether or not intentional,  the Court could  have ruled  that at least as
applied  to a narrower set of conduct  (for example,  intentional state infringements)
the Patent Remedy Act was not disproportionate and thus could be constitutionally be
applied on this narrower basis.  And had the Court followed that approach, it appears
that there would  have been no occasion  to consider any possible "process" defect  in
the Act.
Other arguments for permitting facial attacks in some cases might be based upon
(a) the unavailability of a determinate rule to delineate the narrowed scope for valid
statutory application,  see Henry Paul Monaghan,  Overbreadth,  1981  Sup. CT. REV.  1;  cf.
Note,  The First Amendment  Overbreadth  Doctrine, 83  HARv.  L. REv.  844  (1970); or  (b)
relatedly, whether such  excision can easily be imposed or instead would burden  the
courts by requiring a very large number of as-applied attacks in order clearly and fully
to  remove constitutional  defects,  cf. Baggett v.  Bullitt, 377 U.S.  360,  376-78  (1964)
(refusing  to abstain in  a vagueness  challenge  where it was  "fictional to believe  that
anything less than  extensive  adjudications, under  the impact of a variety  of factual
situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of permissible constitutional cer-
tainty").  However, a simple holding that the Patent Remedy Act could be applied to
intentional  (and perhaps  reckless)  conduct but not to negligent or faultless conduct
would have been more than adequately determinate.  Cf New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S.  1 (1964)  (holding that common  law liability for defamation of public
figures could be enforced only when the defendant acted with knowledge of or reck-
less disregard for the truth, even though state defamation doctrine did not itself im-
pose that scienter requirement).
192  See Fallon,  supra note 191.
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But all of this is speculation, for the majority offers no explanation of,
much less justification for, its facial invalidation of the Patent Remedy
Act.
The Court's second reason for finding that state patent infringe-
ment may not violate the Due Process  Clause is  equally problematic.
Relying  on  the  doctrine  of  Parratt v.  Taylor'9 3  and  Zinermon  v.
Burch,194 the Court held that a state's patent infringement, even if  a
deprivation, would not necessarily constitute a deprivation  without due
process. The Parratt  and Zinermon decisions ruled that when a depriva-
tion of liberty or property is random and unauthorized, the only pro-
cess due is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy (for example, a tort
action against the state or the responsible officials); thus, a procedural
due process violation  comes into being only when  the state  fails  to
provide such a post-deprivation  remedy.  But the Patent Remedy Act,
the Supreme Court reasoned, by authorizing a federal patent infringe-
ment remedy without regard to the existence  of a state post-depriva-
tion  remedy,  extends  to  circumstances  in  which  the  state  has
committed no constitutional violation.
Here, too, however, the Florida  Prepaid  Court paid no attention to
whether the Patent Remedy Act was constitutional  as applied  to the
facts  in  the case.  For under  the  Parratt[Zinermon  doctrine,  the  Act
would reach beyond  the Due  Process  Clause  only if  (a)  the alleged
deprivation by the State of Florida was random and unauthorized'9 5
and (b)  Florida in  fact provided meaningful post-deprivation  redress
under state law.  The Court did not inquire whether either, much less
both, of these conditions  obtained.
96
193  451  U.S.  527  (1981).
194  494 U.S. 113 (1990).
195  On  that point, the facts  in F/ohida Prepaid  were very different from those  of
Parratt  and its progeny, which were one-shot instances of unlawful conduct by individ-
ual state officers.  In florida  Prepaid  the state was continuously involved in the market-
ing of a  product  that it knew  the  plaintiff claimed  to  be  an  infringement of the
plaintiff's  patent.  On those  facts,  the plaintiff patent holder might well  have been
able  to  establish that, in the words of the  Zinermon decision, it "seeks to hold state
officials  accountable  for  their abuse  of their  broadly  delegated,  uncircumscribed
power to  effect the deprivation at issue."  Zinemnon, 494 U.S. at 136.
196  Moreover, the idea  that patent infringement  issues should be  determined in
state  courts  under state  post-deprivation  remedies is  itself troubling  for a  different
reason.  As Justice  Stevens noted in his dissent, see Alden,  119 S. Ct. at 2212-13,  Con-
gress has long determined that claims arising under the patent laws should be within
the  exclusive jurisdiction  of the  federal  courts,  which  are  more  expert  than  state
courts  and  better able  to  promote  much-needed  uniformity,  see 28  U.S.C.  §  1338
(1994).  For much the same reasons, but far more exceptionally, Congress has consol-
idated appeals in patent cases in a single circuit-the Court of  Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.  See id.  §  1295.  Yet the f/orida  Prepaid  opinion wreaks havoc with this system in
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Quite apart from the Court's departure from as-applied adjudica-
tion, the Forida  Prepaid opinion seems  to hurdle  past difficult ques-
tions in invalidating the Patent Remedy Act's purported abrogation  of
state sovereign immunity. The Zinermon opinion had clearly stated (in
dictum but without dissent  on this point) that the existence  of post-
deprivation  remedies  is relevant  only to  procedural and not to sub-
stantive due process claims.197  That limitation is not merely a techni-
cal point of doctrine, but a  critically important understanding of the
reach  of federal  constitutional  protection.  Three-quarters  of a  cen-
tury earlier, in Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of  Los Angeles,'98
the Supreme Court affirmed that the Constitution protects individuals
against action  by a state  official-even  if that action was  not author-
ized by or contrary to the policy of the state, and whether or not the
state courts would stand ready to provide redress for the official's vio-
lation of state  law.  The  Parratt-Zinermon  rule is  a limited  exception
to  that  fundamental  proposition,  one  that,  to  date,  the  Court  has
confined  to  procedural  due process  violations  that are  random  and
unauthorized. 99  It  is  not  an  easy  question  whether,  under  the
Court's  precedents,  a  state's  deprivation  of  intellectual  property
rights via infringement of a patent is better viewed under the rubric
of substantive  due  process-as  an  interference  with  property rights
that  is  complete  when  effected-or  under  the  rubric  of  proce-
dural  due  process-in  which  case  a  post-deprivation  remedy  is,  at
least  in  some  circumstances,  all  the  process  that  is  due.200  Here
those cases in which the alleged patent infringer is a state government: for even when
an alleged  infringement might violate  constitutionally protected  property rights, on
the Court's theory the only remedy (at least in states that do provide post-deprivation
remedies)  is for patent holders  to file suit in state trial courts and to proceed though
the state court system,  with virtually no chance of obtaining federal review.
197  Zinermon, 494  U.S. at 124-27.
198  227 U.S.  278  (1913).
199  A second exception to the general rule of Home Telephone is found in the rule,
long pre-dating Parratt  and  Zinermon, that under the Just Compensation Clause a tak-
ing of property by a state official  without authorization  does  not give the property
holder a right to compensation from the state, but instead  only to remedies  against
the official.  See infra note 205.  It is a question worthy of further study how that doc-
trine and the rule of Home Telephone came to  co-exist.
200  For  some  discussion  of this  question  from  quite  different  frameworks,  see
Christina Bohannan  & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional  in Light of  Semi-
nole Tribe ?,  67 FoRDRAm  L. REV.  1435,  1503-08  (1999),  Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,  Some
Confusions About Due Process,  Judicial  Review,  and Constitutional  Remedies, 93 COLUM.  L.
REV.  309 (1993),  and PaulJ. Heald & Michael L. Wells,  Remedies  for the Misappropriation
of  Intellectual  Property  by State and Municipal  Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe:
The Eleventh Amendment  and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55  WASH.  & LEE  L.  REV.  849,
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too,  however,  the  Court's  opinion  fails  even  to advert  to  the  ques-
tion.
2 01
In one last respect, the Court's opinion is open to criticism-for
its failure to give Congress the "wide latitude" promised by the  City of
Boerne opinion "in determining where  [the line]"  lies "between meas-
ures that remedy or prevent  unconstitutional  actions and  measures
that make a substantive  change in  the governing law."20 2  In invalidat-
ing RFRA, the  City of Boerne Court noted that while only those gener-
ally applicable  state laws  enacted  because of religious  bigotry violate
the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA had subjected all state  laws to a form
of statutory strict scrutiny--and had done so without legislative  find-
ings  that unconstitutional  motivation  was  commonly present.2 03  In
Foida  Prepaid,  the Court similarly questioned the means/ends fit, ob-
jecting  that  Congress,  when  enacting  the  Patent  Remedy  Act, had
identified no pattern  of patent infringement  (much less of constitu-
tional violations)  by the states.  The analogy to  City of  Boerne, however,
was misplaced.  There, the ratio  of constitutional violations to statutory
applications was, in the Court's view, inordinately low.  But under the
Patent Remedy Act-assuming  that its application were limited to in-
tentional  patent infringements  that are  deprivations  of property,20 4
900-01  (1998).  My  own view  is that the  entire set of cases  has  mischaracterized  in
procedural  due process terms what should be viewed as substantive harms, and that
the  critical question  should be  whether the  substantive  harm  is the  kind  of injury
against which  the Constitution provides  protection.  For an  elaboration of a similar
view,  see, for example, Michael Wells & Thomas A.  Eaton, Substantive Due Process and
the Scope of Constitutional  Torts, 18 GA. L.  REv.  201  (1984).
201  Moreover, as VickiJackson  has pointed out, the evident purpose of the Parratt-
Zinermon doctrine  was  to  avoid  federalizing  routine  state  law  actions  when  the
tortfeasor happens to be someone  acting under color of state law-hardly a concern
in the patent area, which long has been the exclusive domain of the national govern-
ment.  See Vicki C. Jackson,  Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the De-
nationalization  of  Federal Law, 30  RUTGERS  L. REV.  (forthcoming 2000).
202  City of  Boern,  521  U.S. at 519-520.  Note in the companion decision in  College
Savings Bank v. Florida  Prepaid  Postseconday  Education Expense Board, 119 S.  Ct.  2219
(1999),  an offhand comment by the Court described  the scope of power under Sec-
tion 5 in terms far narrower than those used in  City of  Boerne. After having found that
the state conduct at issue did not constitute a deprivation of property, the Court said,
[W]e need not pursue the follow-on question that City of Boernewould other-
wise require  us to  resolve: whether the prophylactic  measure  taken under
purported authority of Section 5 (viz., prohibition of States' sovereign-immu-
nity  claims,  which  are  not  in  themselves  a  violation  of the  Fourteenth
Amendment)  was  genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 2225  (emphasis  added).
203  City of Boerne, 521 U.S.  at 530-31.
204  See supra note 191.
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and that at least a good number of those deprivations will be without
due process of law-the ratio of such instances of patent infringement
to the number of constitutional violations will be relatively high.  Per-
haps the absolute numbers  of both will be small if, as  the Court sug-
gested,  patent  infringement  by  states  is  not  a  large  problem.  But
whether the absolute number of state infringements is large or small,
the ratio of statutory violations to constitutional violations will be the
same.  Thus, even  if the Court was correct  in suggesting that patent
infringement  by states is infrequent, nothing in  City of Boerne, or else-
where  in the Constitution, bars  Congress from enacting  limited stat-
utes to address limited problems.
Thus, the Court's analysis  in Florida  Prepaid  of the constitutional-
ity of the Patent Remedy Act suffered from a multitude of difficulties.
Those difficulties might be the product of end of the Term pressures,
but more likely they arose from a determination to announce a ruling
that the Act was invalid in toto, so as to preserve the principle  of state
sovereign  immunity.2 0 5  My  own  view,  which  I  have  explained  else-
205  See HART & WECHSLER  1999  SUPPLEMENT,  supra note *, at 105.  The  Court did
not consider a distinct argument for upholding the Patent Remedy Act-that it was a
valid  exercise  of power  under  Section  5  to  enforce  the  constitutional  protection
against takings of property without just compensation.  Noting that neither the text
nor the committee  reports suggested  that Congress had in mind the Just Compensa-
tion  Clause,  the  Court took  the  view that Congress's  explicit reliance  on its  (pur-
ported) authority under Article I and its authority under Section 5 to enforce the due
process  right "preclude [d]  consideration  of the Just Compensation  Clause as a basis
for the Patent Remedy Act."  Horida Prepaid,  119  S.  Ct. at 2208 n.7.
That refusal  was somewhat extraordinary,  though not entirely  unprecedented.
For example,  in  the  Civil Rights Cases, 109  U.S.  3  (1883),  the Court invalidated  sec-
tions  1-2 of the Civil  Rights Act of 1875  as falling outside the scope of the congres-
sional  authority under the enforcement  clauses  of the  13th and  14th Amendments.
In so ruling, the Court refused to consider whether those provisions, in at least cer-
tain applications,  might be justified as a valid  exercise of the commerce power, rea-
soning that the provisions  "in question are not conceived in any such view."  Id. at 19.
The dissent objected in turn: "Has it ever been held that the judiciary should overturn
a statute, because the legislative department did not accurately  recite therein the par-
ticular provision  of the Constitution authorizing its enactment?"  Id. at 60  (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
More recent authority, however, suggests, that no such recitation  is necessary.  In
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983),  the Court stated that the constitutionality of a
federal statute does not depend on whether Congress recited the particular source of
legislative  authority under which  the statute  might be  upheld.  Id. at  243-44  n.18
(quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.  138, 144 (1948)).  The statement was
strictly dictum, as the Court there upheld the ADEA under the commerce power, on
which  Congress  had explicitly relied.  However, both the  majority opinion and the
ChiefJustice's dissent appeared to agree that Congress, in extending that act to state
and local  governmental employers,  had not expressly relied upon any purported au-
1o62 [VOL-  75:3STATE  SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY
where,20 6 is that the entire structure of abrogation doctrine-permit-
ting  congressional  abrogation  under  the Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth
Amendments  but not under Article  I-makes little  sense.  But that
structure seems for the moment well-entrenched, and more litigation
as to the scope of legislative authority under Section 5 will be required
to determine  whether  existing  efforts  by Congress  to abrogate  Elev-
enth Amendment immunity are constitutionally valid. 2 0 7  Already one
more decision  in this line has been handed down, holding that Con-
gress  lacks  power under Section  5 to abrogate  state immunity from
suit under the Age Discrimination  in  Employment Act.20 8  Although
thority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.  See id, at 243-44 n.18; id. at 251-52
(Burger, C.J.,  dissenting).  And in its recent decision in Kimel v. Florida  Board of Re-
gents, 120  S.  Ct. 631  (2000), the Court did proceed to rule on whether that same act,
as applied to state employers, could be upheld as an exercise of congressional power
under Section 5-without suggesting  any disagreement with the view that Congress
had not purported  to  rely  on  that  source  of legislative  authority  in  enacting  the
ADEA.
With regard to the Patent Remedy Act, given that Congress made clear its inten-
tion both to regulate the states and to rely on both Article I and Section 5 powers  in
doing so, it is  difficult to see what purpose would be served by refusing to consider
whether  the Act might be justified  as  a measure  enforcing the Just Compensation
rather than the Due Process Clause.
In the end, however, given the Court's approach to tlke due process argument in
Florida  Prepaid,  it is doubtful that a Section 5 argument based on the Just Compensa-
tion Clause would have prevailed.  First, it appears  to be well accepted under the Just
Compensation  Clause that government action that is ultra vires is not a taking.  See
generally Matthew D. Zinn, Note,  Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MIcH. L. REV. 245 (1998).  This
understanding presents a particular problem if, as some have argued, federal intellec-
tual property  laws preempt authority  states would otherwise  have  to condemn,  and
pay just compensation for, intellectual property rights.  See Bohannan & Cotter, supra
note 200, at 1459-69.  On that view, because states by definition lack authority to take
intellectual  property rights, any infringement by officials is unauthorized.  Whatever
the correct view on the preemption issue, insofar as state officials who were infringing
patents were doing so without state authorization, their conduct would not give rise to
a  right to just compensation  and thus, under the  approach  of F/orida  Prepaid,  the
Patent Remedy Act would be constitutionally suspect as sweeping more broadly than
does the Constitution.
Relatedly,  even where a taking is  not ultra vires, a claim for just compensation
ordinarily is not ripe until the claimant has sought compensation under state law.  See
Williamson  County Reg'l Planning Comm'n  v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.  172 (1985).
Insofar as states do offer compensation for takings of intellectual property rights, then
under the analysis  of Florida  Prepaid the Patent Remedy Act would, for a second rea-
son,  reach far beyond the scope of the Just Compensation  Clause.
206  See Meltzer,  supra note 9, at 20-24.
207  See id. at 47-50.
208  Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.  Ct. 631  (2000),  affirming Kimel v. State
Bd.  of Regents,  139  F.3d  1426  (11th  Cir.  1998).  This  Term, the  Supreme  Court
granted  certiorari in two cases  raising the  question whether  Congress has  constitu-
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that decision  seems to  be a straightforward  application  of the frame-
work of City ofBoerne,209 one may still fear that pronouncements about
the reach  of Section 5 may be shaped by the Court's wish to prevent
congressional  "evasions" of sovereign  immunity  and may unduly re-
strict  legislative  authority  to  enforce  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.
And any restrictions  that result will,  of course,  have ripple effects in
cases having nothing  to do with sovereign  immunity.
VII.  CONCLUSION
It remains  to be seen whether  Congress  will continue  to  try to
find new means, consistent with the most recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, to make states subject to private suits seeking damages
for violations of federal law.  While  Alden closed off what might have
been  one  means  to  achieve  that objective  (suit in state  court),  and
Florida  Prepaid  limited a second (abrogation of immunity by legislation
enacted  under Section  5),  Congress  has other possible  techniques at
hand:  to condition federal spending,210  or perhaps the failure to pre-
empt  state  power,  on state  waivers  of immunity, or to  authorize  qui
tam actions on the theory that they fall under the protective umbrella
of suits by the United States.  While none of the opinions in the three
sovereign  immunity  decisions  is  very  illuminating  as  to  the pre-ex-
isting  uncertainties  about  the scope  or validity  of these  techniques,
some language could be viewed as signaling that some of these mecha-
nisms may also  be limited if not sacrificed at the altar of state  sover-
eign immunity.
211
tional power  to abrogate  the states'  11th Amendment immunity from suit under the
Americans  with Disabilities  Act, but certiorari  was  dismissed  in both cases.  See Alsb-
rook v.  Arkansas,  120  S.  Ct. 1003,  cert. dismissed, No.  99-423,  2000 WL  230234  (U.S.
Mar. 1, 2000); Florida Dep't of Corrections  v. Dickson,  120  S.  Ct. 976,  cert. dismissed,
No. 98-829,  2000 WL  215674  (U.S.  Feb. 23,  2000).
209  The dissenters  made no effort to argue that the ADEA was a valid exercise  of
legislative authority under Section 5; instead, they took issue with the holding of Semi-
nole Tibe that Congress lacks power, when legislating under Article I, to abrogate state
sovereign  immunity.  See 120  S. Ct. at 650-52  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210  See Litman v. George Mason Univ.,  186 F.3d 544  (4th Cir.  1999).
211  The  Court's language  in  Alden concerning  conditional  spending  is  entirely
unilluminating:  "Nor, subject to constitutional limitations,  does the Federal  Govern-
ment  lack  the authority  or  means  to seek the  States'  voluntary  consent  to  private
suits."  Alden, 119  S. Ct. at 2267.
The  discussion  of suits  by the  United  States could  be viewed  as ominous with
regard to the qui tam issue:
[A]  suit which is commenced  and prosecuted against a State in the name of
the United States  by those who are entrusted with the constitutional  duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. CONST.  art. II,  § 3, differs in
1o64 [VOL.  75"32000]  STATE  SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY  1065
Already this Term, the Court has ruled that Congress lacks power
to  abrogate  immunity from suit  alleging  age  discrimination, 21 2  and
has granted certiorari in two  cases  to  decide  a similar question as to
suit under the Americans  with Disabilities Act, but certiorari was  dis-
missed in both  cases.215  Also  pending  is  a case  in which  the Court
could decide whether states enjoy sovereign immunity from qui tam
kind from  the  suit of an  individual:  While  the  Constitution  contemplates
suits among the members of the federal system as an alternative to extralegal
measures, the fear of private suits against nonconsenting States was the cen-
tral reason given by the founders who chose to preserve the States' sovereign
immunity.  Suits brought by the United States itself require  the exercise of  polit-
ical responsibility  for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent
from a broad delegation to private  persons to sue nonconsenting States.
Id. (emphasis  added).  For a powerful  argument that sovereign  immunity does not
shield states from qui tam actions, see  Caminker, supra note 56.
As for conditional preemption-that  is, legislation providing that state activity in
a particular area will be preempted unless the state waives  sovereign immunity-the
holding in the companion  decision in  College Savings Bank v. Florida  Prepaid  Postsecon-
daty Education  Expense Board, 119  S. Ct. 2219  (1999),  may cast some doubt upon the
constitutionality of at least some uses of that legislative  technique.  The Court there
ruled that Florida had not waived its sovereign  immunity  by engaging in federally-
regulated for profit activity in the face of a federal statute clearly providing that such
activity would subject the state to suit.  In expressly  rejecting any notion of construc-
tive waiver of immunity, the Court distinguished holdings permitting Congress to re-
quire a state to waive its immunity as a condition of obtaining federal funds or federal
approval of an interstate compact. Those holdings, the Court ruled in  College Savings
Bank, involved congressional grants of gratuities  (spending or approval of compacts);
by contrast, exclusion of a state from otherwise permissible  activity, the Court stated,
is not a gratuity but a sancion.  See id. at 2231.  Preemption, needless  to say, is pre-
cisely exclusion  of a state from otherwise permissible  activity.
Of course, there is a baseline problem here that the Court failed to acknowledge.
Suppose that Congress had in an initial enactment unconditionally preempted states
from operating railroads  that engage in  or affect interstate commerce.  If Congress
were thereafter,  in a second  enactment, to offer  the states  the opportunity to  have
that prohibition  lifted, so  as to permit them to operate  railroads, on the  condition
that states waive immunity, that offer would expand the states' options as compared to
the baseline of the prior unconditional preemption of state authority.  Thus, it would
be hard to view the second  enactment as imposing a sanction.  Yet it is difficult to
believe  that the constitutionality  of a statutory scheme that preempts state authority
unless the state waives  immunity should depend on whether the congressional action
was taken all at once (in which case the state could be viewed as excluded from other-
wise permissible  activity)  or in two  steps (in which case  the state  could be viewed as
permitted, conditionally, to  engage in what would otherwise be impermissible).
212  See Kime4 120  S.  Ct. at 643.
213  See Alsbrook, 120  S.  Ct. at 1003;  Dickson, 120  S.  Ct. at 976.NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
actions, 214  as well as a different case raising the question whether the
Violence Against Women Act falls within the scope of the commerce
power.21 5  I suspect that national power may be trimmed back still fur-
ther by the Term's end.
Judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on national power, it
has been argued, has value in  part because  it may shape  the political
process:  Supreme Court  decisions  attract Congress's attention, while
providing  another set of arguments  that states  can raise in  the polit-
ical forum.21 6  One need not quarrel with that view to note that every-
thing depends on what the limit is.  One cannot take as a premise that
there must be some judicially enforceable limit,
2 1 7 no matter how arti-
ficial  or unresponsive  to the underlying federalism concerns,  or how
plainly at odds with the prevailing will of the  political branches,  any
particular limit might be.  And distinctive constitutional limits on the
suability of states are, for all the reasons noted above, difficult limits to
justify.
We  live in an era in which Congress not infrequently passes legis-
lation that gives the federal government an unnecessary role in mat-
ters  better left  to  the states.  To  a  considerable  extent, the problem
has passed well  beyond  the range  of judicial  correction,  for most of
the  important  and  debatable  exercises  of federal  power  in  recent
years  fall  comfortably  within  the  range  of constitutional  authority.
Even the statute invalidated in Lopez-one widely and correctly viewed
as a dubious exercise of federal power-was rather easily rehabilitated
to fit within constitutional bounds with little loss in its reach.218
The majority in Alden and F/orida  Prepaid  may have thought that
by protecting a small enclave of state autonomy, it was helping to right
a ship  of state  that was  listing in  the direction of excessive  national
intervention.  But for the reasons noted above, the solution provided
seems  constitutionally  doubtful  and  functionally  harmful.  Without
touching  the  dubious  exercises  of national  power just  noted,  the
Court invalidated legislation that the national government reasonably
214  United States  ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources,  162 F.3d
195  (2d  Cir.  1998),  cert. granted, 119  S.  Ct. 2391  (1999),  order directing supplemental
briefing, 120 S.  Ct. 523  (1999).
215  See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999)  (invalidating the Violence Against Women  Act),  cert. granted sub nom.  United
States  v. Morrison,  120 S. Ct.  11  (1999).
216  Cf Jackson,  supra note 1, at 2226-28.  See generally  Adler & Kreimer, supra note
1, at 134-40; Monaghan,  supra  note 16, at 121-22  (stating that decisions like  Seminole
Tribe "work as a catalyst for political and social change").
217  See Kramer, supra note 56.
218  See supra note 159.
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and perhaps correctly viewed as necessary for effective national regula-
tion  with regard  to  matters  (fair labor standards  and patent regula-
tion) historically and properly undertaken by the federal government.
I have previously  suggested that the Court's attempt to cling to con-
ceptions  of state  sovereign  immunity  is  not stable, and  that history
casts serious doubt on the capacity of the Court to stand against the
current  of  the  national  political  process  in  any  sustained  way.2 19
(Such a prediction-much like a prediction that the stock market will
soar or crash-is more  likely eventually  to  be  proven  correct if re-
peated with sufficient frequency.)
What will retard improvident  exercises  of federal power, if any-
thing will,  is not constitutional intervention but political responsibil-
ity.  I have no great hope that such responsibility will be forthcoming:
nearly everyone claims to believe in federalism, but for most the belief
is  an anemic one, easily overcome when it might stand in the way of
particular  political  or programmatic  objectives.220  Still,  misdirected
judicial intervention  can make  a bad situation worse.  In  a perhaps
apocryphal  story, a member of the British Parliament  is once said to
have remarked,  "Reform?  Don't speak to me of reform.  Things are
bad enough as they are."  There  may be wisdom in that remark not
only for legislators but also for judges.
219  See Meltzer,  supra note 9, at 64.
220  For a  stronger statement,  see JEREMY  RABKIN,  WHY  SOVEREIGNT  MATmaS  8
(1998)  (noting that by the early 1990s, "[t]he notion that some matters are properly
reserved for the state and localities to determine for themselves...  seemed almost to
have disappeared from political culture as well as constitutional  law").
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